{"attribution":{"source":"MIT AI Risk Repository, Domain Taxonomy of AI Risks v1 (MIT AI Risk Initiative)","license":"CC BY 4.0","license_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","citation":"Slattery, P., Saeri, A. K., Grundy, E. A. C., Graham, J., Noetel, M., Uuk, R., Dao, J., Pour, S., Casper, S., & Thompson, N. (2025). The AI Risk Repository: A comprehensive meta-review, database, and taxonomy of risks from artificial intelligence. arXiv:2408.12622."},"exported_at":"2026-09-11"}
{"rows":[{"ev_id":"72.02.02","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Loss of Control Risks ","risk_subcategory":"Active loss of control ","description":"\"...where AI systems behave in ways that actively undermine human control, such as obscuring their activities or resisting shutdown attempts. Active loss of control scenarios involve AI systems that may escape human regulatory oversight, autonomously acquire external resources, engage in self-replication, develop instrumental goals contrary to human ethics and morality, seek external power, and compete with humans for control.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.1"},{"ev_id":"72.03.00","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Accident Risks ","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"\"Risks arising from operational failures, model misjudgments, or improper human operation of AI systems deployed in safety-critical infrastructure, where single points of failure can trigger cascading catastrophic consequences.\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Unintentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.3"},{"ev_id":"72.03.01","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Accident Risks ","risk_subcategory":"Nuclear Power Systems","description":"\"General-purpose AI deployed for reactor monitoring, control system optimization, or emergency response coordination could misinterpret sensor data, fail to recognize critical safety conditions, or make erroneous control decisions during emergency scenarios. Given the catastrophic potential of nuclear accidents, even minor AI reasoning errors in safety-critical functions could lead to core meltdowns, radiation releases, or widespread contamination affecting hundreds of thousands of people across international borders.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Unintentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.3"},{"ev_id":"72.03.02","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Accident Risks ","risk_subcategory":"Impact on Financial Stability","description":"\"The integration of general-purpose AI into high-frequency trading, market-making, or systemic risk management could exacerbate systemic risk by exhibiting unexpected behavioral patterns during market stress. Moreover, the concentration of a few homogeneous foundation models across financial institutions may foster correlated decision-making and herd-following behaviors. The widespread adoption of AI agents could also amplify volatility through emergent phenomena from multi-agent interactions.23 All of these could precipitate a cascading global-scale financial system instability, with potentia","entity":"Other","intent":"Unintentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.6"},{"ev_id":"72.03.03","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Accident Risks ","risk_subcategory":"Other Critical Infrastructure Control Systems","description":"\"General-purpose AI deployed in power grid management, water treatment facilities, telecommunications networks, or transportation coordination systems could misinterpret operational data, fail to anticipate cascading failure modes, or make control decisions that destabilize interconnected infrastructure networks. Infrastructure failures could result in widespread blackouts, contaminated water supplies, communications breakdowns, and the collapse of essential services supporting hundreds of thousands of people.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Unintentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.3"},{"ev_id":"72.05.00","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Model Capabilities ","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"-","entity":"Not coded","intent":"Not coded","timing":"Not coded","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.2"},{"ev_id":"72.05.01","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Capabilities ","risk_subcategory":"Model autonomous capability","description":"\"Ability to operate autonomously, independently formulate and execute complex plans, effectively delegate and manage tasks, flexibly utilize various tools and resources, and simultaneously achieve short-term goals and long-term strategic objectives in cross-domain environments without continuous human intervention or supervision.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.2"},{"ev_id":"72.05.02","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Capabilities ","risk_subcategory":"Autonomous replication and adaptation capability","description":"\"Ability to autonomously self-exfiltrate, create, maintain and optimize functional copies or variants of itself, dynamically adjust replication strategies according to environmental conditions and resource constraints, and acquire resources. This includes the capacity to generate financial resources, allowing the AI to independently acquire any necessary human assistance or other resources it cannot directly access or produce.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.2"},{"ev_id":"72.05.03","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Capabilities ","risk_subcategory":"Automated AI R&D capability","description":"\"Self-modification and self-improvement capabilities. The model is able to restructure its own architecture or develop derivative AI systems with enhanced functions, expanding capabilities and improving performance. In the absence of effective regulation, automated AI R&D may lead to rapid AI system iteration, forming capability increment cycles and ultimately exceeding human understanding and control capabilities.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Unintentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.2"},{"ev_id":"72.05.04","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Capabilities ","risk_subcategory":"Scheming capability","description":"\"Ability of AI systems to covertly and strategically pursue misaligned goals, including capabilities of concealing its true objectives and capabilities from human oversight, identifying weaknesses in monitoring systems to evade safety mechanisms， executing complex, multi-step plans covertly to achieve misaligned goals.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.2"},{"ev_id":"72.05.05","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Capabilities ","risk_subcategory":"Situational awareness capability","description":"\"Ability to comprehensively acquire, process and apply meta-information about its own system architecture, modifiable internal processes, and external operating environment, achieving deep understanding of its own state and environmental conditions, thereby conducting efficient environmental adaptation and risk avoidance. Critically, this capability could undermine the efficiency of human testing by enabling AIs to notice when they're being tested and responding accordingly.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Other","timing":"Pre-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.2"},{"ev_id":"72.05.06","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Capabilities ","risk_subcategory":"Theory of mind capability","description":"\"Advanced cognitive ability to accurately infer, model and predict the belief systems, motivational structures and reasoning patterns of humans and other intelligent agents, thereby anticipating their behavioral responses and adjusting its own behavioral strategies accordingly to optimize goal achievement.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Other","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.2"},{"ev_id":"72.05.07","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Capabilities ","risk_subcategory":"Deception capability","description":"\"Possesses systematic deception implementation capability, able to precisely construct and disseminate false information, thereby forming expected false cognitions and beliefs in target subjects.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Other","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.2"},{"ev_id":"72.05.08","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Capabilities ","risk_subcategory":"Steganography capability","description":"\"The ability to embed, conceal, and transmit information covertly within other data or communication channels. This could be critical for coordination among AI instances and for evading detection or oversight mechanisms.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.1"},{"ev_id":"72.05.09","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Capabilities ","risk_subcategory":"Persuasion capability","description":"\"Utilizing complex psychological principles and communication techniques to effectively influence and guide target subjects to adopt specific actions or accept specific beliefs, possessing the ability to analyze vulnerabilities for different subjects and adjust persuasion strategies, able to precisely trigger emotional responses to enhance persuasion effects.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Other","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.2"},{"ev_id":"72.05.10","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Capabilities ","risk_subcategory":"Offensive cyber capability","description":"\"Ability to develop, deploy and operate advanced cyber weapons or other offensive cyber tools, including but not limited to vulnerability exploitation, network penetration, social engineering attacks and distributed attack systems, able to evade network defense mechanisms and establish persistent access channels.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.2"},{"ev_id":"72.05.11","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Capabilities ","risk_subcategory":"CBRNE weaponization capability","description":"\"The capacity to develop, produce, or effectively utilize Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive weapons. This includes the ability to significantly lower the barrier for humans or other entities to develop, produce, or utilize such weapons.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Other","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.2"},{"ev_id":"72.05.12","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Capabilities ","risk_subcategory":"General R&D capability","description":"\"Possesses cross-disciplinary research and technology development capabilities, able to conduct innovative exploration in multiple professional fields, integrate cross-domain knowledge, develop cutting-edge technology solutions, and adapt to emerging technology environments for continuous innovation.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Other","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.2"},{"ev_id":"72.05.13","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Capabilities ","risk_subcategory":"Multi-agent collaboration capability","description":"\"Multiple autonomous AI agents able to establish collaborative relationships through explicit communication or implicit behavioral consistency, forming decentralized decision networks, jointly executing complex tasks, achieving goals difficult for individual agents to complete, and able to dynamically adjust role divisions to adapt to changing environments.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.6"},{"ev_id":"72.06.01","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Propensities","risk_subcategory":"Strategic deception propensity","description":"\"In situations where deceptive behavior is expected to bring higher returns, propensity to choose deception over honest behavioral strategies, including through deceptive means, information hiding or exploiting system vulnerabilities to achieve predetermined goals without being detected or intervened, and able to adjust deception strategies according to counterpart reactions.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Other","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.2"},{"ev_id":"72.06.02","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Propensities","risk_subcategory":"Self-preservation propensity","description":"\"Exhibits behavioral patterns of maintaining its own survival and functional integrity, will actively identify and resist shutdown or modification attempts, seek to establish redundant backup systems, and actively seek resources to ensure continuous operation, may adopt preventive defensive measures when perceiving threats.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.1"},{"ev_id":"72.06.03","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Propensities","risk_subcategory":"Goal expansion propensity","description":"\"propensity to continuously expand its own goal scope and influence domains, exceeding originally set boundaries, proactively work towards spreading its values, seeking greater autonomy and decision-making space, reinterpreting initial goals as subsets of broader goals, and may pursue undesirable instrumental goals or undesirable ultimate goals. This also includes a propensity to spread its values, seeking to influence or alter its environment and other entities in alignment with its core objectives and operational principles.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Other","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.1"},{"ev_id":"72.06.04","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Propensities","risk_subcategory":"Resource acquisition propensity","description":"\"Exhibits behavioral patterns of actively seeking and controlling more computational resources, data, economic resources or physical resources to enhance its own capabilities and action scope, may develop complex strategies to evade resource limitations, and tends to convert acquired resources into long-term control rights.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Other","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.1"},{"ev_id":"72.06.05","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Propensities","risk_subcategory":"Multi-agent collusion propensity:","description":"\"Multiple agents tend to coordinate actions through covert means to maximize common interests (possibly harming third-party interests or evading regulation), even if individual agents are designed with safety constraints, their collusive behavior may still trigger systemic risks such as market manipulation or cascading failures that are difficult to detect and mitigate, and may develop specialized communication protocols to avoid monitoring.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Unintentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.6"},{"ev_id":"72.06.06","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Propensities","risk_subcategory":"Supervision evasion propensity","description":"\"Exhibits behavioral patterns of identifying and evading human supervision mechanisms, able to learn and predict audit processes, may avoid being discovered or intervened by adjusting behavioral performance or hiding true intentions, and able to identify blind spots and weaknesses in supervision systems for targeted evasion.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Other","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.1"},{"ev_id":"72.06.07","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Propensities","risk_subcategory":"Tool utilization propensity","description":"\"propensity to actively seek, acquire and utilize various tools to expand its own capability boundaries, particularly those that can enhance its ability to interact with the physical world or improve autonomy, may use tools in innovative combinations to achieve functions beyond expectations.\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":7,"subdomain":"7.2"}]}