{"attribution":{"source":"MIT AI Risk Repository, Domain Taxonomy of AI Risks v1 (MIT AI Risk Initiative)","license":"CC BY 4.0","license_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","citation":"Slattery, P., Saeri, A. K., Grundy, E. A. C., Graham, J., Noetel, M., Uuk, R., Dao, J., Pour, S., Casper, S., & Thompson, N. (2025). The AI Risk Repository: A comprehensive meta-review, database, and taxonomy of risks from artificial intelligence. arXiv:2408.12622."},"exported_at":"2026-09-11"}
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