{"attribution":{"source":"MIT AI Risk Repository, Domain Taxonomy of AI Risks v1 (MIT AI Risk Initiative)","license":"CC BY 4.0","license_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","citation":"Slattery, P., Saeri, A. K., Grundy, E. A. C., Graham, J., Noetel, M., Uuk, R., Dao, J., Pour, S., Casper, S., & Thompson, N. (2025). The AI Risk Repository: A comprehensive meta-review, database, and taxonomy of risks from artificial intelligence. arXiv:2408.12622."},"exported_at":"2026-09-11"}
{"rows":[{"ev_id":"03.05.00","quick_ref":"Cunha2023","paper_title":"Navigating the Landscape of AI Ethics and Responsibility","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Enabling malicious actors and harmful actions","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"\"Some uses of AI have been deeply concerning, namely voice cloning [58] and the generation of deep fake videos [59]. For example, in March 2022, in the early days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, hackers broadcast via the Ukrainian news website Ukraine 24 a deep fake video of President Volodymyr Zelensky capitulating and calling on his soldiers to lay down their weapons [60]. The necessary software to create these fakes is readily available on the Internet, and the hardware requirements are modest by today’s standards [61]. Other nefarious uses of AI include accelerating password cracking [","entity":"Other","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"04.07.00","quick_ref":"Deng2023","paper_title":"Towards Safer Generative Language Models: A Survey on Safety Risks, Evaluations, and Improvements","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Malicious Use and Unleashing AI Agents","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"LMs, due to their remarkable capabilities, carry the same potential for malice as other technological products. For instance, they may be used in information warfare to generate deceptive information or unlawful content, thereby having a significant impact on individuals and society. As current LMs are increasingly built as agents to accomplish user objectives, they may disregard the moral and safety guidelines if operating without adequate supervision. Instead, they may execute user commands mechanically without considering the potential damage. They might interact unpredictably with humans a","entity":"Other","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"06.11.00","quick_ref":"Hogenhout2021","paper_title":"A framework for ethical Ai at the United Nations","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Malicious use of AI","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"\"Just as AI can be used in many different fields, it is unfortunately also helpful in perpetrating digital crimes. AI-supported malware and hacking are already a reality.\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"07.01.00","quick_ref":"Kilian2023","paper_title":"Examining the differential risk from high-level artificial intelligence and the question of control","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Misuse","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"\"The misuse class includes elements such as the potential for cyber threat actors to execute exploits with greater speed and impact or generate disinformation (such as \"deep fake\" media) at accelerated rates and effectiveness\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"16.04.00","quick_ref":"Weidinger2022","paper_title":"Taxonomy of Risks posed by Language Models","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Risk area 4: Malicious Uses","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"\"These risks arise from humans intentionally using the LM to cause harm, for example via targeted disinformation campaigns, fraud, or malware. Malicious use risks are expected to proliferate as LMs become more widely accessible\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"17.04.00","quick_ref":"Weidinger2021","paper_title":"Ethical and social risks of harm from language models","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Malicious Uses ","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"\"Harms that arise from actors using the language model to intentionally cause harm\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"18.04.00","quick_ref":"Weidinger2023","paper_title":"Sociotechnical Safety Evaluation of Generative AI Systems","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Malicious Use ","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"\"AI systems reducing the costs and facilitating activities of actors trying to cause harm (e.g. fraud, weapons)\"","entity":"AI","intent":"Other","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"22.01.00","quick_ref":"Hendrycks2023","paper_title":"An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Malicious Use (Intentional)","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"\"empowering malicious actors to cause widespread harm\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"24.03.00","quick_ref":"Gabriel2024","paper_title":"The Ethics of Advanced AI Assistants","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Malicious Uses","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"\"As AI assistants become more general purpose, sophisticated and capable, they create new opportunities in a variety of fields such as education, science and healthcare. Yet the rapid speed of progress has made it difficult to adequately prepare for, or even understand, how this technology can potentially be misused. Indeed, advanced AI assistants may transform existing threats or create new classes of threats altogether\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"30.04.00","quick_ref":"Liu2024","paper_title":"Trustworthy LLMs: A Survey and Guideline for Evaluating Large Language Models’ Alignment","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Resistance to Misuse","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"Prohibiting the misuse by malicious attackers to do harm","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"49.01.00","quick_ref":"Bengio2024","paper_title":"International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Malicious Use Risks ","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"\"As general- purpose AI covers a broad set of knowledge areas, it can be repurposed for malicious ends, potentially causing widespread harm. This section discusses some of the major risks of malicious use, but there are others and new risks may continue to emerge. While the risks discussed in this section range widely in terms of how well- evidenced they are, and in some cases, there is evidence suggesting that they may currently not be serious risks at all, we include them to provide a comprehensive overview of the malicious use risks associated with general- purpose AI systems.\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"52.02.00","quick_ref":"Maham2023 ","paper_title":"Governing General Purpose AI: A Comprehensive Map of Unreliability, Misuse and Systemic Risks ","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Misuse Risks ","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"\"However, even if a model is entirely trustworthy and reliable, Misuse or Systemic Risks remain. General purpose AI models may present significant risks to society if this technology is misused by malicious actors to produce harmful outcomes. Misuse Risks span across Cyber Crime, Biosecurity Threats and Politically Motivated Misuse.\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"60.01.00","quick_ref":"Bengio2025","paper_title":"International AI Safety Report 2025","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Risks from malicious use ","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"- ","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Other","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"61.02.22","quick_ref":"Uuk2025","paper_title":"A Taxonomy of Systemic Risks from General-Purpose AI ","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Sources of systemic risks from general-purpose AI ","risk_subcategory":"Dual-use nature","description":"\"AI’s potential for both beneficial and harmful applications complicates efforts to manage its societal impacts effectively.\"","entity":"Other","intent":"Unintentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"62.15.03","quick_ref":"Gipiškis2024","paper_title":"Risk Sources and Risk Management Measures in Support of Standards for General-Purpose AI Systems","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Model Development ","risk_subcategory":"Fine-tuning related (Ease of reconfiguring GPAI models)","description":"\"GPAI models are often easily reconfigured for various use cases or have competencies beyond the intended use [78, 225]. They can be performed either by changing the weights of the model (e.g., fine-tuning) or by modifying only the model inputs (e.g., prompt engineering, jailbreaking, retrieval-augmented generation). Reconfiguration can be intentional (with the help of adversarial inputs) or unintentional (from unanticipated inputs to the model).\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Other","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"62.29.01","quick_ref":"Gipiškis2024","paper_title":"Risk Sources and Risk Management Measures in Support of Standards for General-Purpose AI Systems","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Impacts of AI (General) ","risk_subcategory":"High-impact misuses and abuses beyond original purpose","description":"\"Since general-purpose AI systems have a large repertoire of capabilities, mali- cious actors such as foreign actors can use such systems to cause large damage if they gain unrestricted or unmonitored access to those AI systems.\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"62.29.02","quick_ref":"Gipiškis2024","paper_title":"Risk Sources and Risk Management Measures in Support of Standards for General-Purpose AI Systems","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Impacts of AI (General) ","risk_subcategory":"Democratizing access to dual-use technologies","description":"\"Access to dual-use technologies can become easier because of GPAI model pro- liferation (in particular, open-source or open-weights models). Non-experts can use such dual-use-capable systems at a minimal cost [194, 100]. Improved model capabilities also contribute to dual-use risks posed by malicious actors. For example, an open-source base model for generating high quality sequence data can be modified to generate candidate protein sequences for toxin synthesis [29].\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Other","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"65.14.03","quick_ref":"IBM2025","paper_title":"AI Risk Atlas ","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Output risks (misuse) ","risk_subcategory":"Spreading toxicity","description":"\"Generative AI models might be used intentionally to generate hateful, abusive, and profane (HAP) or obscene content.\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"65.14.04","quick_ref":"IBM2025","paper_title":"AI Risk Atlas ","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"Output risks (misuse) ","risk_subcategory":"Dangerous use","description":"\"Generative AI models might be used with the sole intention of harming people.\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"67.03.00","quick_ref":"DSIT2023","paper_title":"Capabilities and Risks from Frontier AI","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Misuse risks","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"\"Frontier AI may help bad actors to perform cyberattacks, run disinformation campaigns and design biological or chemical weapons. Frontier AI will almost certainly continue to lower the barriers to entry for less sophisticated threat actors.192 We focus here on only a few important misuse risks, but this is not to downplay the importance of others.\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"71.02.01","quick_ref":"Tang2025","paper_title":"Risks of AI Scientists: Prioritizing Safeguarding Over Autonomy","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"User Intent ","risk_subcategory":"Malicious and Direct ","description":"\"Directly harmful objective\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Other","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"71.02.01a","quick_ref":"Tang2025","paper_title":"Risks of AI Scientists: Prioritizing Safeguarding Over Autonomy","level":"Additional evidence","risk_category":"User Intent ","risk_subcategory":"Malicious and Direct ","description":null,"entity":null,"intent":null,"timing":null,"domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"71.02.02","quick_ref":"Tang2025","paper_title":"Risks of AI Scientists: Prioritizing Safeguarding Over Autonomy","level":"Risk Sub-Category","risk_category":"User Intent ","risk_subcategory":"Malicious and Indirect","description":"\"Benign intermediate for harmful end objective\"","entity":"Other","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Other","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"71.02.02a","quick_ref":"Tang2025","paper_title":"Risks of AI Scientists: Prioritizing Safeguarding Over Autonomy","level":"Additional evidence","risk_category":"User Intent ","risk_subcategory":"Malicious and Indirect","description":null,"entity":null,"intent":null,"timing":null,"domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"72.01.00","quick_ref":"Tse2025","paper_title":"Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0)","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Misuse Risks ","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"\"Risks arising from intentional exploitation of AI model capabilities by malicious actors to cause harm to individuals, organisations, or society.\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"},{"ev_id":"73.03.00","quick_ref":"Anwar2024","paper_title":"Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models","level":"Risk Category","risk_category":"Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs","risk_subcategory":null,"description":"\"Like all technologies, LLMs have the possibility for misuse by malicious actors. Malicious use of dual- use capabilities of AI is a recurring concern within literature (Brundage et al., 2018; Hendrycks et al., 2023; Mozes et al., 2023)\"","entity":"Human","intent":"Intentional","timing":"Post-deployment","domain":4,"subdomain":"4.0"}]}