MIT AI Risk Repository · Risk Sub-Category · 63.01.01

Incompatible strategies

Category: Miscoordination

Open the MIT Risk Navigator All entries from Hammond2025

Description

"Incompatible Strategies. Even if all agents can perform well in isolation, miscoordination can still occur due to the agents choosing incompatible strategies (Cooper et al., 1990). Competitive (i.e., two- player zero-sum) settings allow designers to produce agents that are maximally capable without taking other players into account. Crucially, this is possible because playing a strategy at equilibrium in the zero-sum setting guarantees a certain payoff, even if other players deviate from the equilibrium (Nash, 1951). On the other hand, common-interest (and mixed-motive) settings often allow a

From Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025), as extracted by the MIT AI Risk Repository (CC BY 4.0).

Classification

Domain: 7. AI system safety, failures, & limitations
Subdomain: 7.6 Multi-agent risks
Causal entity: AI
Intent: Unintentional
Timing: Post-deployment

Subdomain definition: Risks from multi-agent interactions, due to incentives (which can lead to conflict or collusion) and/or the structure of multi-agent systems, which can create cascading failures, selection pressures, new security vulnerabilities, and a lack of shared information and trust.

How other frameworks describe this risk

Groups of LLM-Agents May Show Emergent Functionality
Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models (Anwar2024)
Collusion between LLM-Agents
Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models (Anwar2024)
Multi-Agent Safety Is Not Assured by Single-Agent Safety
Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models (Anwar2024)
Foundationality May Cause Correlated Failures
Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models (Anwar2024)
Financial instability due to model homogeneity
Risk Sources and Risk Management Measures in Support of Standards for General-Purpose AI Systems (Gipiškis2024)
Impact on Financial Stability
Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0) (Tse2025)
Multi-agent collaboration capability
Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0) (Tse2025)
Multi-agent collusion propensity:
Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0) (Tse2025)

Other entries from Hammond2025

Miscoordination Risk Category · 7.6
Miscoordination Additional evidence
Incompatible strategies Additional evidence
Credit Assignment Risk Sub-Category · 7.6
Limited Interactions Risk Sub-Category · 7.6
Conflict Risk Category · 7.6
Conflict Additional evidence
Conflict Additional evidence
Social Dilemmas Risk Sub-Category · 7.6
Military Domains Risk Sub-Category · 7.6
Coercion and Extortion Risk Sub-Category · 7.6
Collusion Risk Category · 7.6