MIT AI Risk Repository · Risk Sub-Category · 63.02.01
Social Dilemmas
Category: Conflict
Description
"Social Dilemmas. As noted in our definition, conflict can arise in any situation in which selfish incentives diverge from the collective good, known as a social dilemma (Dawes & Messick, 2000; Hardin, 1968; Kollock, 1998; Ostrom, 1990). While this is by no means a modern problem, advances in AI could further enable actors to pursue their selfish incentives by overcoming the technical, legal, or social barriers that standardly help to prevent this. To take a plausible, near-term (if very low-stakes) example, an automated AI assistant could easily reserve a table at every restaurant in town in
From Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025), as extracted by the MIT AI Risk Repository (CC BY 4.0).
Classification
- Subdomain
- 7.6 Multi-agent risks
- Causal entity
- AI
- Intent
- Intentional
- Timing
- Post-deployment
Subdomain definition: Risks from multi-agent interactions, due to incentives (which can lead to conflict or collusion) and/or the structure of multi-agent systems, which can create cascading failures, selection pressures, new security vulnerabilities, and a lack of shared information and trust.
How other frameworks describe this risk
- Groups of LLM-Agents May Show Emergent Functionality
- Collusion between LLM-Agents
- Multi-Agent Safety Is Not Assured by Single-Agent Safety
- Foundationality May Cause Correlated Failures
- Financial instability due to model homogeneity
- Impact on Financial Stability
- Multi-agent collaboration capability
- Multi-agent collusion propensity: