MIT AI Risk Repository · Risk Category · 73.02.00
Multi-Agent Safety Is Not Assured by Single-Agent Safety
Description
"A foremost lesson of game theory is that optimal decision-making within a single-agent setting (i.e. selfishly optimizing for an agent’s own utility) can produce sub-optimal outcomes in the presence of other strategic agents. Failing to account for the strategic nature of other agents can cause an agent to adopt strategies under which potentially everyone, including the agent itself, ends up worse off (Schelling, 1981; Harsanyi, 1995; Roughgarden, 2005; Nisan, 2007). Examples include collective action problems (or ‘social dilemmas’) such as arms races or the depletion of common resources, as
From Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models (Anwar2024), as extracted by the MIT AI Risk Repository (CC BY 4.0).
Classification
- Subdomain
- 7.6 Multi-agent risks
- Causal entity
- Other
- Intent
- Other
- Timing
- Other
Subdomain definition: Risks from multi-agent interactions, due to incentives (which can lead to conflict or collusion) and/or the structure of multi-agent systems, which can create cascading failures, selection pressures, new security vulnerabilities, and a lack of shared information and trust.
How other frameworks describe this risk
Other entries from Anwar2024
- Agentic LLMs Pose Novel Risks
- Natural Language Underspecifies Goals
- Goal-Directedness Incentivizes Undesirable Behaviors
- Safety Risks from Affordances Provided to LLM-agents
- Foundationality May Cause Correlated Failures
- Groups of LLM-Agents May Show Emergent Functionality
- Collusion between LLM-Agents
- Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs
- Misinformation and Manipulation
- Cybersecurity
- Cybersecurity
- Cybersecurity