MIT AI Risk Repository · Risk Category · 73.08.00
Vulnerability to Poisoning and Backdoors
Description
"The previous section explored jailbreaks and other forms of adversarial prompts as ways to elicit harmful capabilities acquired during pretraining. These methods make no assumptions about the training data. On the other hand, poisoning attacks (Biggio et al., 2012) perturb training data to introduce specific vulnerabilities, called backdoors, that can then be exploited at inference time by the adversary. This is a challenging problem in current large language models because they are trained on data gathered from untrusted sources (e.g. internet), which can easily be poisoned by an adversary (
From Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models (Anwar2024), as extracted by the MIT AI Risk Repository (CC BY 4.0).
Classification
- Domain
- 2. Privacy & Security
- Causal entity
- Human
- Intent
- Intentional
- Timing
- Pre-deployment
Subdomain definition: Vulnerabilities in AI systems, software development toolchains, and hardware that can be exploited, resulting in unauthorized access, data and privacy breaches, or system manipulation causing unsafe outputs or behavior.
Real-world incidents in this subdomain
- COEMPT Quality Assurance Engineers Allegedly Violated Indian CBSE Student Data Privacy Rights by Processing It with Google Gemini
- Hidden Prompt Injection in Brazilian Labor-Court Petition Reportedly Tried to Manipulate Galileu
- Meta Internal AI Agent Reportedly Gave Advice That Allegedly Exposed Sensitive Data to Unauthorized Employees
- CodeWall's Autonomous Agent Reportedly Obtained Unauthorized Access to McKinsey's Lilli AI Platform Database
- Anthropic Said DeepSeek, Moonshot, and MiniMax Used Fraudulent Accounts and Proxies to Illicitly Distill Claude Capabilities at Scale
- DJI Romo Cloud Authorization Bug Reportedly Exposed Camera, Microphone, and Home-Mapping Data From Nearly 7,000 Robot Vacuums
How other frameworks describe this risk
Other entries from Anwar2024
- Agentic LLMs Pose Novel Risks
- Natural Language Underspecifies Goals
- Goal-Directedness Incentivizes Undesirable Behaviors
- Safety Risks from Affordances Provided to LLM-agents
- Multi-Agent Safety Is Not Assured by Single-Agent Safety
- Foundationality May Cause Correlated Failures
- Groups of LLM-Agents May Show Emergent Functionality
- Collusion between LLM-Agents
- Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs
- Misinformation and Manipulation
- Cybersecurity
- Cybersecurity