MIT AI Risk Repository · Risk Sub-Category · 63.04.02
Bargaining
Category: Information Asymmetries
Description
"Bargaining. As a classic example of these strategic considerations is that when agents attempt to come to an agreement despite diverging interests, information asymmetries can lead to bargaining inef- ficiencies (Myerson & Satterthwaite, 1983). Relevant uncertainties about other agents can include how much they value possible agreements, their outside options, or their beliefs about others. The essential reason for such inefficiencies is that, under uncertainty about their counterparties, agents must make a trade-off between the rewards of making more favourable demands and the risk of other
From Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025), as extracted by the MIT AI Risk Repository (CC BY 4.0).
Classification
- Subdomain
- 7.6 Multi-agent risks
- Causal entity
- AI
- Intent
- Unintentional
- Timing
- Post-deployment
Subdomain definition: Risks from multi-agent interactions, due to incentives (which can lead to conflict or collusion) and/or the structure of multi-agent systems, which can create cascading failures, selection pressures, new security vulnerabilities, and a lack of shared information and trust.
How other frameworks describe this risk
- Groups of LLM-Agents May Show Emergent Functionality
- Collusion between LLM-Agents
- Multi-Agent Safety Is Not Assured by Single-Agent Safety
- Foundationality May Cause Correlated Failures
- Financial instability due to model homogeneity
- Impact on Financial Stability
- Multi-agent collaboration capability
- Multi-agent collusion propensity: