MIT AI Risk Repository · Risk Sub-Category · 63.04.02

Bargaining

Category: Information Asymmetries

Description

"Bargaining. As a classic example of these strategic considerations is that when agents attempt to come to an agreement despite diverging interests, information asymmetries can lead to bargaining inef- ficiencies (Myerson & Satterthwaite, 1983). Relevant uncertainties about other agents can include how much they value possible agreements, their outside options, or their beliefs about others. The essential reason for such inefficiencies is that, under uncertainty about their counterparties, agents must make a trade-off between the rewards of making more favourable demands and the risk of other

From Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025), as extracted by the MIT AI Risk Repository (CC BY 4.0).

Classification

Causal entity
AI

Subdomain definition: Risks from multi-agent interactions, due to incentives (which can lead to conflict or collusion) and/or the structure of multi-agent systems, which can create cascading failures, selection pressures, new security vulnerabilities, and a lack of shared information and trust.

How other frameworks describe this risk

Other entries from Hammond2025