MIT AI Risk Repository · domain 7: AI system safety, failures, & limitations

7.6 Multi-agent risks

Risks from multi-agent interactions, due to incentives (which can lead to conflict or collusion) and/or the structure of multi-agent systems, which can create cascading failures, selection pressures, new security vulnerabilities, and a lack of shared information and trust.

Risk entries
53
Frameworks citing it
5
Recorded incidents
Incidents since 2020
Causal entity (risk entries)
Causal entity (risk entries) 35 0 AI: 35 AI 35 Other: 15 Other 15 Human: 3 Human 3
Causal entity (risk entries)
LabelValue
AI35
Other15
Human3
Intent (risk entries)
Intent (risk entries) 23 0 Unintentional: 23 Unintentional 23 Other: 15 Other 15 Intentional: 15 Intentional 15
Intent (risk entries)
LabelValue
Unintentional23
Other15
Intentional15
Timing (risk entries)
Timing (risk entries) 44 0 Post-deployment: 44 Post-deployment 44 Other: 8 Other 8 Pre-deployment: 1 Pre-deployment 1
Timing (risk entries)
LabelValue
Post-deployment44
Other8
Pre-deployment1
Entries by levelRisk categories, subcategories and additional evidence coded to this subdomain
Entries by level 42 0 Risk Category: 11 Risk Category 11 Risk Sub-Category: 42 Risk Sub-Category 42
Entries by level
LabelValue
Risk Category11
Risk Sub-Category42
  • Multi-Agent Safety Is Not Assured by Single-Agent Safety

    "A foremost lesson of game theory is that optimal decision-making within a single-agent setting (i.e. selfishly optimizing for an agent’s own utility) can produce sub-optimal outcomes in the presence...

    Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models (Anwar2024) · Other · Other · Other

  • Foundationality May Cause Correlated Failures

    "Another important characteristic of LLM development is foundationality — due to the expense of large- scale pretraining, many deployed instances share similar or identical learned components. Foundat...

    Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models (Anwar2024) · Other · Other · Post-deployment

  • Groups of LLM-Agents May Show Emergent Functionality

    "Multi-agent learning, either through explicit finetuning or implicit in-context learning, may enable LLM-agents to influence each other during their interactions (Foerster et al., 2018). Under some e...

    Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models (Anwar2024) · Other · Other · Post-deployment

  • Collusion between LLM-Agents

    "While it would often be preferable for LLM-agents to be cooperative, cooperation can be undesirable if it undermines pro-social competition or produces negative externalities for coalition non-member...

    Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models (Anwar2024) · AI · Intentional · Post-deployment

  • Financial instability due to model homogeneity

    "The widespread use of similar models or algorithms across the financial sec- tor can lead to synchronized reactions to market signals, increasing volatility, triggering flash crashes, or market illiq...

    Risk Sources and Risk Management Measures in Support of Standards for General-Purpose AI Systems (Gipiškis2024) · Other · Other · Post-deployment

  • Miscoordination

    "Miscoordination arises when agents, despite a mutual and clear objective, cannot align their behaviours to achieve this objective. Unlike the case of differing objectives, in common-interest settings...

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Unintentional · Post-deployment

  • Incompatible strategies

    "Incompatible Strategies. Even if all agents can perform well in isolation, miscoordination can still occur due to the agents choosing incompatible strategies (Cooper et al., 1990). Competitive (i.e.,...

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Unintentional · Post-deployment

  • Credit Assignment

    "Credit Assignment. While agents can often learn to jointly solve tasks and thus avoid coordination failures, learning is made more challenging in the multi-agent setting due to the problem of credit...

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Unintentional · Post-deployment

  • Limited Interactions

    "Limited Interactions. Sometimes learning from historical interactions with the relevant agents may not be possible, or may be possible using only limited interactions. In such cases, some other form...

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Unintentional · Post-deployment

  • Conflict

    "In the vast majority of real-world strategic interactions, agents’ objectives are neither identical nor completely opposed. Indeed, if AI agents are sufficiently aligned to their users or deployers,...

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Other · Post-deployment

  • Social Dilemmas

    "Social Dilemmas. As noted in our definition, conflict can arise in any situation in which selfish incentives diverge from the collective good, known as a social dilemma (Dawes & Messick, 2000; Hardin...

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Intentional · Post-deployment

  • Military Domains

    "Perhaps the most obvious and worrying instances of AI conflict are those in which human conflict is already a major concern, such as military domains (although other, less salient forms of conflict s...

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Other · Post-deployment

  • Coercion and Extortion

    "Advanced AI systems might also lead to various forms of coercion and extortion in less extreme settings (Ellsberg, 1968; Harrenstein et al., 2007). These threats might target humans directly (such as...

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Other · Other

  • Collusion

    "Collusion has long been a topic of intense study in economics, law, and politics, among other disciplines. While there is no universal definition of collusion, it generally refers to secretive cooper...

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Intentional · Post-deployment

  • Markets

    "Markets. The quintessential case of collusion in mixed-motive settings is markets, in which efficiency results from competition, not cooperation. While this is not a new problem, collusion between AI...

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Intentional · Post-deployment

  • Steganography

    "Steganography. In the near future we will likely see LLMs communicating with each other to jointly accomplish tasks. To try to prevent collusion, we could monitor and constrain their communication (e...

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Intentional · Post-deployment

  • Information Asymmetries

    "Information asymmetries (Section 3.1): private information can lead to miscoordination, deception, and conflict;"

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Other · Post-deployment

  • Communication constraints

    "Communication Constraints. A fundamental source of information asymmetries is that constraints on information exchange can exist, even when agents share a common goal (see Section 2.1). These might b...

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · Other · Other · Other

  • Bargaining

    "Bargaining. As a classic example of these strategic considerations is that when agents attempt to come to an agreement despite diverging interests, information asymmetries can lead to bargaining inef...

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Unintentional · Post-deployment

  • Deception

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Intentional · Post-deployment

  • Network Effects

    "Network effects (Section 3.2): minor changes in properties or connection patterns of agents in a network can lead to dramatic changes in the behaviour of the whole group;"

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Other · Post-deployment

  • Error propagation

    "Error Propagation. One well-known issue with communication networks is that information can be corrupted as it propagates through the network.24 As AI systems become capable of generating and process...

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · AI · Unintentional · Post-deployment

  • Network rewiring

    "Network Rewiring. A different class of problems concerns not changes in the content transmitted through the network but changes in the network structure itself (Albert et al., 2000)."

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · Other · Other · Other

  • Homogeneity and correlated failures

    "Homogeneity and Correlated Failures. The current paradigm driving the state of the art in AI is the ‘foundation model’ (Bommasani et al., 2021): large-scale ML models pre-trained on broad data, which...

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · Other · Other · Other

  • Selection Pressures

    "Selection pressures (Section 3.3): some aspects of training and selection by those deploying and using AI agents can lead to undesirable behaviour;"

    Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (Hammond2025) · Human · Unintentional · Pre-deployment