Practical requirements extracted from policy instruments, with the source article, the actors they bind, evidence examples and original framework mappings. Legal requirements are marked; everything else is voluntary guidance.
ICO AI guidance · UK GDPR Article 35; ICO guidance, accountability and governance section
Where AI processing of personal data is likely to result in a high risk to individuals, UK GDPR requires a DPIA before processing begins. The ICO treats most AI involving profiling, large-scale processing or novel technology as meeting this threshold.
Source-linked (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
Before deploying most Annex III high-risk systems, deployers that are bodies governed by public law or private entities providing public services, and deployers using systems for creditworthiness assessment or life and health insurance pricing, must assess the impact on fundamental rights: the processes, period and frequency of use, categories of affected persons, specific risks of harm, human-oversight measures and mitigation, and notify the market-surveillance authority of the results.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
UAE PDPL · Article on data protection impact assessment (reviewer to cite article number)
Before processing that uses modern technologies and is likely to pose a high risk to privacy, controllers must assess the impact on personal data protection, covering the processing, its purposes, risks and safeguards.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
Deployers must complete an impact assessment before deployment, annually, and within 90 days of any intentional and substantial modification, covering purpose, risks of algorithmic discrimination and mitigation, data categories, performance metrics, transparency measures and post-deployment monitoring, and retain assessments for at least three years.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
Entities notified as Significant Data Fiduciaries, based on factors such as volume and sensitivity of data and risk to individuals, must appoint a Data Protection Officer based in India, an independent data auditor, and periodically undertake data protection impact assessments and audits.
Source-linked (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
If a deployer discovers that a high-risk AI system it uses has caused algorithmic discrimination, it must send a notice to the Colorado Attorney General within 90 days of the discovery, in the form the Attorney General prescribes, without unreasonable delay.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
Within 90 days after a developer discovers, through ongoing testing or a credible report from a deployer, that a high-risk AI system it developed has caused or is reasonably likely to have caused algorithmic discrimination, it must disclose this to the Colorado Attorney General and to all known deployers or other developers of the system, without unreasonable delay.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
Legal requirementIncident reporting and handling·India
India DPDP Act · Section 8(5) and 8(6); DPDP Rules on breach intimation
Data Fiduciaries must protect personal data with reasonable security safeguards and, on a personal data breach, inform the Data Protection Board and each affected individual in the form and manner prescribed by the Rules.
Source-linked (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
Legal requirementIncident reporting and handling·European Union
A provider that considers, or has reason to consider, that a high-risk system it has placed on the market is not in conformity must immediately correct it, withdraw it, disable it or recall it as appropriate, and inform the distributors, deployers, authorised representative and importers. Where the system presents a risk to health, safety or fundamental rights and the provider becomes aware of that risk, it must immediately investigate the causes together with the reporting deployer and inform the market surveillance authorities and, where relevant, the notified body.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
Legal requirementIncident reporting and handling·European Union
Providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic risk must keep track of, document and report without undue delay to the AI Office and, where relevant, to national competent authorities the relevant information about serious incidents and the possible corrective measures to address them. The General-Purpose AI Code of Practice sets out timelines and content that providers may follow to demonstrate compliance.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Aug 2025
California SB 53 · Business and Professions Code, Chapter 25.1 (as added by SB 53)
Frontier developers must report critical safety incidents to the California Office of Emergency Services within the statutory time limit after discovery, and the Office is to establish a reporting mechanism.
Source-linked (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 1 Jan 2026
Legal requirementIncident reporting and handling·European Union
Providers of high-risk AI systems must report serious incidents to the market-surveillance authority of the Member State where the incident occurred, immediately after establishing a causal link (or reasonable likelihood) and no later than 15 days after becoming aware, with shorter limits for the most serious cases such as widespread infringements or death. Deployers must inform the provider and authorities when they identify a serious incident.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
Deployers must monitor a high-risk AI system's operation against the provider's instructions and feed observations to the provider under Article 72. If they have reason to think the system as used may present a risk to health, safety or fundamental rights, they must inform the provider or distributor and the market surveillance authority without undue delay and suspend use. On a serious incident, they must immediately inform the provider, then the importer or distributor and the authorities. Financial institutions meet this through their internal governance rules.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
Providers must establish and document a post-market monitoring system proportionate to the nature of the AI technology and its risks, actively and systematically collecting and analysing performance data throughout the system's lifetime, based on a monitoring plan that is part of the technical documentation. The Commission is to adopt a template for the plan.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
Legal requirementPrivacy and personal-data protection·Nepal
Nepal Privacy Act 2075 · Chapter on collection and protection of personal information (reviewer to cite sections)
Personal information may be collected only by authorised persons for a lawful purpose with the individual's consent, and must not be used or disclosed for other purposes without consent, subject to statutory exceptions. AI systems trained on or processing personal data of people in Nepal must respect these limits.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
Legal requirementPrivacy and personal-data protection·European Union
Where a deployer of a high-risk AI system is required to carry out a data protection impact assessment under Article 35 of the GDPR or Article 27 of the Law Enforcement Directive, it must draw on the information the provider supplied under Article 13, such as the intended purpose, performance, limitations and human-oversight measures, when producing that assessment.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
Unless already disclosed on the website, an employer or employment agency must provide, within 30 days of a written request from a candidate or employee, information about the type of data the automated employment decision tool collects, the source of that data, and the employer's or agency's data retention policy. The DCWP rules allow this information to be posted publicly instead of answered case by case.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 5 Jul 2023
Legal requirementPrivacy and personal-data protection·Singapore
PDPC AI advisory guidelines · Advisory guidelines, sections on consent, business improvement and research exceptions
Personal data used to train or operate AI systems requires consent unless an exception applies, such as the business improvement exception for improving products and services or the research exception for developing models, each subject to conditions.
Source-linked (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
Legal requirementPrivacy and personal-data protection·India
Personal data may be processed only for a lawful purpose with the individual's free, specific, informed and unambiguous consent, or for certain legitimate uses listed in the Act. A notice must describe the data, purpose, and how to exercise rights and complain.
Source-linked (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
A person may not develop or deploy an AI system in a manner that intentionally aims to incite or encourage a person to commit physical self-harm, including suicide, to harm another person, or to engage in criminal activity. The prohibition turns on the developer's or deployer's intent rather than on the system's effects, which is the pattern followed throughout the Act's prohibited-use provisions.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 1 Jan 2026
A person may not develop or deploy an AI system with the intent to unlawfully discriminate against a protected class in violation of state or federal law. A disparate impact on a protected class is not, by itself, sufficient to show an intent to discriminate, and insurers and financial institutions acting under their own regulatory regimes are treated separately.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 1 Jan 2026
A person may not develop or distribute an AI system with the sole intent of producing, assisting or aiding in producing, or distributing child pornography or unlawful deep-fake videos or images, including sexually explicit deepfakes of a person without consent, or of engaging in sexually explicit text-based conversations while impersonating or imitating a child, in violation of the Texas Penal Code.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 1 Jan 2026
Article 5 bans placing on the market, putting into service or using AI for listed practices, including subliminal or manipulative techniques that cause significant harm, exploitation of vulnerabilities, social scoring by public or private actors leading to detrimental treatment, untargeted scraping of facial images to build recognition databases, emotion recognition in workplaces and education institutions except for medical or safety reasons, biometric categorisation to infer protected characteristics, and real-time remote biometric identification in publicly accessible spaces for law enforcement outside narrow exceptions.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Feb 2025
A governmental entity may not develop or deploy an AI system for the purpose of uniquely identifying a specific individual using biometric data, or of gathering images or other media from the internet or another public source without the individual's consent, where doing so would infringe a right guaranteed under the United States or Texas constitutions or violate state or federal law. The Act preserves lawful uses that comply with existing biometric-privacy law.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 1 Jan 2026
A governmental entity may not develop or deploy an AI system that evaluates or classifies natural persons or groups on the basis of their social behaviour or personal characteristics, with the intent to calculate or assign a social score or similar valuation that leads to detrimental or unfavourable treatment unrelated to the context in which the data was collected, or that is unjustified or disproportionate to the behaviour.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 1 Jan 2026
A single practical requirement pulled out of an instrument and stated on its own: keep a risk management system, log incidents, document training data, provide human oversight, and so on. Each one cites the article or section it comes from so you can check it against the source.
Does a voluntary obligation have legal force?
No, and every obligation is labelled either a legal requirement or voluntary guidance. Voluntary items still matter in practice, because procurement questionnaires and auditors ask about them, but only the binding ones carry legal consequence.
How do I find the obligations that apply to my organisation?
Filter by jurisdiction, category, actor, sector or use case. The applicability check asks a short set of questions and returns the duties that may reach you. It is an educational screen, not a legal determination, and it says so.
Why do some instruments have no obligations listed?
Because nobody has broken them out yet. Most instruments are recorded at summary level first; obligations are added jurisdiction by jurisdiction. The coverage and open-gaps pages publish exactly what is missing rather than hiding it.
