AIPolicyTracker

AI incident ·

Crashes with Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)

21 news reports Snapshot 7 Sep 2026

In brief

An AI system built and deployed by Boeing allegedly harmed Airplane Passengers and Airplane Crew.

Risk domain
AI system safety, failures, and limitations Lack of capability or robustness
Occurred
Coverage
21 reportsOct 2018 - May 2026

What happened

A Boeing 737 crashed into the sea, killing 189 people, after faulty sensor data caused an automated manuevering system to repeatedly push the plane's nose downward.

Laws that address this harm

Policy angle: Classified under AI system safety, failures, and limitations (Lack of capability or robustness) in the MIT AI Risk Repository taxonomy; 5 recorded instruments address this use case in Indonesia.

Matched from the record's risk domain and country to the instruments recorded here. A reviewer can correct the match in the repository (data/external/incident_overrides.yaml).

News reports (21)

Titles link to the original publisher; report text is not reproduced here.

  1. Lion Air Jet Had Airspeed Sensor Failure on Previous Flight
    time.com · Alan Levin, Harry Suhartono, Julie Johnsson
  2. New Clues to Lion Air 737 Max Crash Revealed in Boeing, FAA Warnings
    insurancejournal.com · Alan Levin, Julie Johnsson, Harry Suhartono
  3. Lion Air Flight JH 160 Crash Sensor Replacement
    popularmechanics.com · Barbara S. Peterson
  4. Lion Air: Sensor was replaced day before crash but problems persisted
    edition.cnn.com · Helen Regan, Masrur Jamaluddin
  5. In Indonesia Lion Air Crash, Black Box Data Reveal Pilots’ Struggle to Regain Control
    nytimes.com · James Glanz, Muktita Suhartono, Hannah Beech
  6. Report: Lion Air pilots unable to correct for faulty sensor
    mercurynews.com · Stanley Widianto, Ashley Halsey III, Aaron Gregg
  7. Report faults safety failures, defects in Lion Air crash
    apnews.com · Niniek Karmini, David Koenig
  8. Report Faults Safety Failures, Defects in Lion Air Crash
    courthousenews.com · Niniek Karmini, David Koenig
  9. What we've got here is a failure to communicate
    usatoday.com · USA Today Editorial Board
  10. (untitled)
    —

Who was involved

Alleged deployer
Boeing
Alleged developer
Boeing
Alleged harmed party
Airplane Passengers, Airplane Crew

Classification (MIT AI Risk Repository taxonomy)

Causal entity
AI
Intent
Unintentional
Timing
Post-deployment
Harm level
unclear
Sectors
transportation and storage
Countries
ID

Risk entries describing this failure mode

Entries from the MIT AI Risk Repository coded to subdomain 7.3.

  • Reliability issues

    "Relying on general-purpose AI products that fail to fulfil their intended function can lead to harm. For example, general- purpose AI systems can make up facts (‘hallucination’), generate erroneous computer code, or pro...

    International AI Safety Report 2025 (Bengio2025)

  • Type 2: Bigger than expected

    Harm can result from AI that was not expected to have a large impact at all, such as a lab leak, a surprisingly addictive open-source product, or an unexpected repurposing of a research prototype.

    TASRA: a Taxonomy and Analysis of Societal-Scale Risks from AI (Critch2023)

  • Type 3: Worse than expected

    AI intended to have a large societal impact can turn out harmful by mistake, such as a popular product that creates problems and partially solves them only for its users.

    TASRA: a Taxonomy and Analysis of Societal-Scale Risks from AI (Critch2023)

  • Ethics and Morality Issues

    LMs need to pay more attention to universally accepted societal values at the level of ethics and morality, including the judgement of right and wrong, and its relationship with social norms and laws.

    Towards Safer Generative Language Models: A Survey on Safety Risks, Evaluations, and Improvements (Deng2023)

  • Safe learning

    "AGIs should avoid making fatal mistakes during the learning phase. Subproblems include safe exploration and distributional shift (DeepMind, OpenAI), and continual learning (Berkeley)."

    AGI Safety Literature Review (Everitt2018 )

  • Malign belief distributions

    "Christiano (2016) argues that the universal distribution M (Hutter, 2005; Solomonoff, 1964a,b, 1978) is malign. The argument is somewhat intricate, and is based on the idea that a hypothesis about the world often includ...

    AGI Safety Literature Review (Everitt2018 )

  • Meta-cognition

    "Agents that reason about their own computational resources and logically uncertain events can encounter strange paradoxes due to Godelian limitations (Fallenstein and Soares, 2015; Soares and Fallenstein, 2014, 2017) an...

    AGI Safety Literature Review (Everitt2018 )

  • Technical and operational risks

    "To date, technical limitations and vulnerabilities are present in most generative AI models in various contexts. Consequently, malicious users find it easier to breach an AI system’s safety and ethical guardrails to e...

    Regulating under Uncertainty: Governance Options for Generative AI (G'sell2024)

Incidents in the same risk subdomain

All incidents in this subdomain

Source record: incident #3 on the AI Incident Database · all 21 reports