AIPolicyTracker

AI incident ·

Uber AV Killed Pedestrian in Arizona

25 news reports Snapshot 7 Sep 2026

In brief

An AI system built and deployed by Uber allegedly harmed Elaine Herzberg and Pedestrians.

Risk domain
AI system safety, failures, and limitations Lack of capability or robustness
Occurred
Coverage
25 reportsMar 2018 - Mar 2022

What happened

An Uber autonomous vehicle (AV) in autonomous mode struck and killed a pedestrian in Tempe, Arizona.

Laws that address this harm

Policy angle: Classified under AI system safety, failures, and limitations (Lack of capability or robustness) in the MIT AI Risk Repository taxonomy; 5 recorded instruments address this use case in the United States.

Matched from the record's risk domain and country to the instruments recorded here. A reviewer can correct the match in the repository (data/external/incident_overrides.yaml).

News reports (25)

Titles link to the original publisher; report text is not reproduced here.

  1. The Economist explains
    economist.com · The Economist
  2. Tempe police release report, audio, photo
    azcentral.com · Chris Coppola, Brieanna J Frank
  3. Uber driver streamed The Voice before self-driving car crash
    cnbc.com · Heather Somerville, David Shepardson
  4. Arizona driver in deadly self-driving Uber crash could face charges
    abc15.com · Kim Tobin, Clayton Klapper, Morgan Bircher

Who was involved

Alleged deployer
Uber
Alleged developer
Uber
Alleged harmed party
Elaine Herzberg, Pedestrians

Classification (MIT AI Risk Repository taxonomy)

Causal entity
AI
Intent
Unintentional
Timing
Post-deployment
Harm level
AI tangible harm event
Sectors
transportation and storage
Countries
US

Risk entries describing this failure mode

Entries from the MIT AI Risk Repository coded to subdomain 7.3.

  • Reliability issues

    "Relying on general-purpose AI products that fail to fulfil their intended function can lead to harm. For example, general- purpose AI systems can make up facts (‘hallucination’), generate erroneous computer code, or pro...

    International AI Safety Report 2025 (Bengio2025)

  • Type 2: Bigger than expected

    Harm can result from AI that was not expected to have a large impact at all, such as a lab leak, a surprisingly addictive open-source product, or an unexpected repurposing of a research prototype.

    TASRA: a Taxonomy and Analysis of Societal-Scale Risks from AI (Critch2023)

  • Type 3: Worse than expected

    AI intended to have a large societal impact can turn out harmful by mistake, such as a popular product that creates problems and partially solves them only for its users.

    TASRA: a Taxonomy and Analysis of Societal-Scale Risks from AI (Critch2023)

  • Ethics and Morality Issues

    LMs need to pay more attention to universally accepted societal values at the level of ethics and morality, including the judgement of right and wrong, and its relationship with social norms and laws.

    Towards Safer Generative Language Models: A Survey on Safety Risks, Evaluations, and Improvements (Deng2023)

  • Safe learning

    "AGIs should avoid making fatal mistakes during the learning phase. Subproblems include safe exploration and distributional shift (DeepMind, OpenAI), and continual learning (Berkeley)."

    AGI Safety Literature Review (Everitt2018 )

  • Malign belief distributions

    "Christiano (2016) argues that the universal distribution M (Hutter, 2005; Solomonoff, 1964a,b, 1978) is malign. The argument is somewhat intricate, and is based on the idea that a hypothesis about the world often includ...

    AGI Safety Literature Review (Everitt2018 )

  • Meta-cognition

    "Agents that reason about their own computational resources and logically uncertain events can encounter strange paradoxes due to Godelian limitations (Fallenstein and Soares, 2015; Soares and Fallenstein, 2014, 2017) an...

    AGI Safety Literature Review (Everitt2018 )

  • Technical and operational risks

    "To date, technical limitations and vulnerabilities are present in most generative AI models in various contexts. Consequently, malicious users find it easier to breach an AI system’s safety and ethical guardrails to e...

    Regulating under Uncertainty: Governance Options for Generative AI (G'sell2024)

Incidents in the same risk subdomain

All incidents in this subdomain

Other incidents involving Uber

Source record: incident #4 on the AI Incident Database · all 25 reports