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977 risk entries extracted from 74 frameworks, coded by domain, subdomain, causal entity, intent and timing. Filter, then export the current selection with its licence and citation attached.

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977 entries · page 13 of 20

  1. 24.04.04 · Risk Sub-Category

    AI Influence

    Sociocultural and Political Harms

    "These harms interfere with the peaceful organisation of social life, including in the cultural and political spheres. AI assistants may cause or contribute to friction in human relationships either directly, through convincing a user to end certain valuable relationships, or indirectly due to a loss of interpersonal trust due to an increased dependency on assistants. At the societal level, the spread of misinformation by AI assistants could lead to erasure of collective cultural knowledge. In the political domain, more advanced AI assistants could potentially manipulate voters by prompting th

    From The Ethics of Advanced AI Assistants (Gabriel2024)

  2. 24.04.05 · Risk Sub-Category

    AI Influence

    Self-Actualisation Harms

    "These harms hinder a person’s ability to pursue a personally fulfilling life. At the individual level, an AI assistant may, through manipulation, cause users to lose control over their future life trajectory. Over time, subtle behavioural shifts can accumulate, leading to significant changes in an individual’s life that may be viewed as problematic. AI systems often seek to understand user preferences to enhance service delivery. However, when continuous optimisation is employed in these systems, it can become challenging to discern whether the system is genuinely learning from user preferenc

    From The Ethics of Advanced AI Assistants (Gabriel2024)

  3. 24.05.07 · Risk Sub-Category

    Anthropomorphism

    Disorientation

    "Given the capacity to fine-tune on individual preferences and to learn from users, personal AI assistants could fully inhabit the users’ opinion space and only say what is pleasing to the user; an ill that some researchers call ‘sycophancy’ (Park et al., 2023a) or the ‘yea-sayer effect’ (Dinan et al., 2021). A related phenomenon has been observed in automated recommender systems, where consistently presenting users with content that affirms their existing views is thought to encourage the formation and consolidation of narrow beliefs (Du, 2023; Grandinetti and Bruinsma, 2023; see also Chapter

    From The Ethics of Advanced AI Assistants (Gabriel2024)

  4. "We anticipate that relationships between users and advanced AI assistants will have several features that are liable to give rise to risks of harm."

    From The Ethics of Advanced AI Assistants (Gabriel2024)

  5. 24.06.02 · Risk Sub-Category

    Appropriate Relationships

    Limiting users’ opportunities for personal development and growth

    some users look to establish relationships with their AI companions that are free from the hurdles that, in human relationships, derive from dealing with others who have their own opinions, preferences and flaws that may conflict with ours. "AI assistants are likely to incentivise these kinds of ‘frictionless’ relationships (Vallor, 2016) by design if they are developed to optimise for engagement and to be highly personalisable. They may also do so because of accidental undesirable properties of the models that power them, such as sycophancy in large language models (LLMs), that is, the tenden

    From The Ethics of Advanced AI Assistants (Gabriel2024)

  6. 24.06.04 · Risk Sub-Category

    Appropriate Relationships

    Generating material dependence without adequate commitment to user needs

    "In addition to emotional dependence, user–AI assistant relationships may give rise to material dependence if the relationships are not just emotionally difficult but also materially costly to exit. For example, a visually impaired user may decide not to register for a healthcare assistance programme to support navigation in cities on the grounds that their AI assistant can perform the relevant navigation functions and will continue to operate into the future. Cases like these may be ethically problematic if the user’s dependence on the AI assistant, to fulfil certain needs in their lives, is

    From The Ethics of Advanced AI Assistants (Gabriel2024)

  7. 35.02.00 · Risk Category

    Enfeeblement

    As AI systems encroach on human-level intelligence, more and more aspects of human labor will become faster and cheaper to accomplish with AI. As the world accelerates, organizations may voluntarily cede control to AI systems in order to keep up. This may cause humans to become economically irrelevant, and once AI automates aspects of many industries, it may be hard for displaced humans to reenter them

    From X-Risk Analysis for AI Research (Hendrycks2022)

  8. 38.04.00 · Risk Category

    Human–AI interaction

    "Several participants mentioned how AI systems could influence human agency and decision-making. They emphasized the need of striking a balance between using the benefits of AI and protecting human autonomy and control. The increasing integration of AI systems into various aspects of our lives, which can have a significant impact on human agency and decision-making, has raised ethical concerns about AI and human–AI interaction. As AI systems advance, they will be able to influence, if not completely replace, IJOES human decision-making in some fields, prompting concerns about the loss of human

    From Ethical Issues in the Development of Artificial Intelligence: Recognizing the Risks (Kumar2023)

  9. 50.01.05 · Risk Sub-Category

    System and Operational Risks

    Operational misuses (Autonomous unsafe operation of systems)

  10. 52.03.03 · Risk Sub-Category

    Systemic Risks

    Disruptions from Outpaced Societal Adaptation

    "Although the implementation of general purpose AI models as automation tools could be a major opportunity, overly rapid adoption of this technology at scale might outpace the ability of society to adapt effectively. This could lead to a variety of disruptions, including challenges in the labour market, the education system and public discourse, and various mental health concerns."

    From Governing General Purpose AI: A Comprehensive Map of Unreliability, Misuse and Systemic Risks (Maham2023 )

  11. 53.03.02 · Risk Sub-Category

    Direct catastrophe from AI

    Gradual, irretrievable ceding of human power over the future to AI systems

  12. 55.02.02 · Risk Sub-Category

    Worsened conflict

    AI enables automation of military decision-making

    "One concern here is humans not remaining in the loop for some military decisions, creating the possibility of unintentional escalation because of: • Automated tactical decision-making, by ‘in-theatre’ AI systems (e.g. border patrol systems start accidentally firing on one another), leading to either: tactical-level war crimes,11 or strategic-level decisions to initiate conflict or escalate to a higher level of intensity—for example, countervalue (e.g. city-) targeting, or going nuclear [62]. • Automated strategic decision-making, by ‘out-of-theatre’ AI systems—for example, conflict prediction

    From A Survey of the Potential Long-term Impacts of AI: How AI Could Lead to Long-term Changes in Science, Cooperation, Power, Epistemics and Values (Clarke2023)

  13. 55.02.03 · Risk Sub-Category

    Worsened conflict

    AI-induced strategic instability

    "For example, AI could undermine nuclear strategic stability by making it easier to discover and destroy previously secure nuclear launch facilities [30, 46, 49]. AI may also offer more extreme first-strike advantages or novel destructive capabilities that could disrupt deterrence, such as cyber capabilities being used to knock out opponents’ nuclear command and control [15, 29]. The use of AI capabilities may make it less clear where attacks originate from, making it easier for aggressors to obfuscate an attack, and therefore reducing the costs of initiating one. By making it more difficult t

    From A Survey of the Potential Long-term Impacts of AI: How AI Could Lead to Long-term Changes in Science, Cooperation, Power, Epistemics and Values (Clarke2023)

  14. 61.02.39 · Risk Sub-Category

    Sources of systemic risks from general-purpose AI

    Personal decision automation capabilities

    "AI models and systems could decide or influence important personal decisions."

    From A Taxonomy of Systemic Risks from General-Purpose AI (Uuk2025)

  15. 62.31.02#1 · Risk Sub-Category

    Impacts of AI (Societal Impacts)

    Overreliance on AI system undermining user autonomy

    "AI systems can undermine human autonomy, if they allow for habitually trusting the AI’s suggestions without sufficient exercising of human agency. Over time, a user may develop unjustified trust in or dependence on the system, or rely on its advice for tasks outside the system’s domain of expertise [205, 42]. In particular, less confident users (or users in emotional distress) can be more prone to “overtrust” a system [219]."

    From Risk Sources and Risk Management Measures in Support of Standards for General-Purpose AI Systems (Gipiškis2024)

  16. 62.36.06 · Risk Sub-Category

    Impacts of AI (Bias)

    Long-term effects of AI model biases on user judgment

    "The initial user exposure to model biases can have a lasting impact beyond the initial interaction with the model. Users who encounter biases in AI models can be affected by and continue to exhibit previously encountered biases in their decision-making, even after they stop using the models [207]."

    From Risk Sources and Risk Management Measures in Support of Standards for General-Purpose AI Systems (Gipiškis2024)

  17. 65.23.08 · Risk Sub-Category

    Non-technical risks (Societal impact)

    Impact on human agency

    "AI might affect the individuals’ ability to make choices and act independently in their best interests."

    From AI Risk Atlas (IBM2025)

  18. 66.07.06 · Risk Sub-Category

    Psychological

    Addiction

    "Emotional or material dependence on technology or a technology system"

    From A Closer Look at the Existing Risks of Generative AI: Mapping the Who, What, and How of Real-World Incidents (Li2025)

  19. 67.04.00 · Risk Category

    Loss of control

    -

    "Humans may increasingly hand over control of important decisions to AI systems, due to economic and geopolitical incentives. Some experts are concerned that future advanced AI systems will seek to increase their own influence and reduce human control, with potentially catastrophic consequences - although this is contested."

    From Capabilities and Risks from Frontier AI (DSIT2023)

  20. "Risks associated with scenarios in which one or more general-purpose AI systems come to operate outside of anyone's control, with no clear path to regaining control. This includes both passive loss of control (gradual reduction in human oversight) and active loss of control (AI systems actively undermining human control)"

    From Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0) (Tse2025)

  21. 11.05.00 · Risk Category

    Societal System Harms

    "Social system or societal harms reflect the adverse macro-level effects of new and reconfigurable algorithmic systems, such as systematizing bias and inequality [84] and accelerating the scale of harm [137]"

    From Sociotechnical Harms of Algorithmic Systems: Scoping a Taxonomy for Harm Reduction (Shelby2023)

  22. "Addresses AI's broader societal effects, including labor displacement, mental health impacts, and issues from manipulative technologies like deepfakes. Additionally, it considers AI's environmental footprint, balancing resource strain and training-related carbon emissions against AI's potential to help address environmental problems."

    From AI Risk Profiles: A Standards Proposal for Pre-Deployment AI Risk Disclosures (Sherman2023)

  23. 15.02.00 · Risk Category

    Second-Order Risks

    "Second-order risks result from the consequences of first-order risks and relate to the risks resulting from an ML system interacting with the real world, such as risks to human rights, the organization, and the natural environment."

    From The Risks of Machine Learning Systems (Tan2022)

  24. 15.02.06 · Risk Sub-Category

    Second-Order Risks

    Organizational

    The risk of financial and/or reputational damage to the organization building or using the ML system.

    From The Risks of Machine Learning Systems (Tan2022)

  25. "LMs create some risks that recur with different types of AI and other advanced technologies making these risks ever more pressing. Environmental concerns arise from the large amount of energy required to train and operate large-scale models. Risks of LMs furthering social inequities emerge from the uneven distribution of risk and benefits of automation, loss of high-quality and safe employment, and environmental harm. Many of these risks are more indirect than the harms analysed in previous sections and will depend on various commercial, economic and social factors, making the specific impact

    From Taxonomy of Risks posed by Language Models (Weidinger2022)

  26. "Harms that arise from environmental or downstream economic impacts of the language model"

    From Ethical and social risks of harm from language models (Weidinger2021)

  27. 06.13.00 · Risk Category

    Exclusion

    "The best AI techniques requires a large amount resources: data, computational power and human AI experts. There is a risk that AI will end up in the hands of a few players, and most will lose out on its benefits."

    From A framework for ethical Ai at the United Nations (Hogenhout2021)

  28. 11.05.04 · Risk Sub-Category

    Societal System Harms

    Labor & material/Macro-socio economic harms

    Algorithmic systems can increase “power imbalances in socio-economic relations” at the societal level [4, 137, p. 182], including through exacerbating digital divides and entrenching systemic inequalities [114, 230]. The development of algorithmic systems may tap into and foster forms of labor exploitation [77, 148], such as unethical data collection, worsening worker conditions [26], or lead to technological unemployment [52], such as deskilling or devaluing human labor [170]... when algorithmic financial systems fail at scale, these can lead to “flash crashes” and other adverse incidents wit

    From Sociotechnical Harms of Algorithmic Systems: Scoping a Taxonomy for Harm Reduction (Shelby2023)

  29. 13.02.03 · Risk Sub-Category

    Impacts: People and Society

    Concentration of Authority

    "Use of generative AI systems to contribute to authoritative power and reinforce dominant values systems can be intentional and direct or more indirect. Concentrating authoritative power can also exacerbate inequality and lead to exploitation."

    From Evaluating the Social Impact of Generative AI Systems in Systems and Society (Solaiman2023)

  30. 16.06.04 · Risk Sub-Category

    Risk area 6: Environmental and Socioeconomic harms

    Disparate access to benefits due to hardware, software, skill constraints

    Due to differential internet access, language, skill, or hardware requirements, the benefits from LMs are unlikely to be equally accessible to all people and groups who would like to use them. Inaccessibility of the technology may perpetuate global inequities by disproportionately benefiting some groups. Language-driven technology may increase accessibility to people who are illiterate or suffer from learning disabilities. However, these benefits depend on a more basic form of accessibility based on hardware, internet connection, and skill to operate the system

    From Taxonomy of Risks posed by Language Models (Weidinger2022)

  31. 17.06.04 · Risk Sub-Category

    Automation, Access and Environmental Harms

    Disparate access to benefits due to hardware, software, skills constraints

    "Due to differential internet access, language, skill, or hardware requirements, the benefits from LMs are unlikely to be equally accessible to all people and groups who would like to use them. Inaccessibility of the technology may perpetuate global inequities by disproportionately benefiting some groups."

    From Ethical and social risks of harm from language models (Weidinger2021)

  32. 18.06.01 · Risk Sub-Category

    Socioeconomic and environmental harms

    Unfair distribution of benefits from model access

    "Unfairly allocating or withholding benefits from certain groups due to hardware, software, or skills constraints or deployment contexts (e.g. geographic region, internet speed, devices)"

    From Sociotechnical Safety Evaluation of Generative AI Systems (Weidinger2023)

  33. 19.01.07 · Risk Sub-Category

    Technological, Data and Analytical AI Risks

    High investment costs of AI hinder integration

  34. 19.03.04 · Risk Sub-Category

    Economic AI Risks

    Financial feasibility and high investment costs for AI technology to remain competitive

  35. 19.03.05 · Risk Sub-Category

    Economic AI Risks

    Lack of AI strategy and acceptance/resistance among employees and customers

  36. 24.09.01 · Risk Sub-Category

    Cooperation

    Equality and inequality

    "AI assistant technology, like any service that confers a benefit to a user for a price, has the potential to disproportionately benefit economically richer individuals who can afford to purchase access (see Chapter 15). On a broader scale, the capabilities of local infrastructure may well bottleneck the performance of AI assistants, for example if network connectivity is poor or if there is no nearby data centre for compute. Thus, we face the prospect of heterogeneous access to technology, and this has been known to drive inequality (Mirza et al., 2019; UN, 2018; Vassilakopoulou and Hustad, 2

    From The Ethics of Advanced AI Assistants (Gabriel2024)

  37. "The most serious access-related risks posed by advanced AI assistants concern the entrenchment and exacerbation of existing inequalities (World Inequality Database) or the creation of novel, previously unknown, inequities. While advanced AI assistants are novel technology in certain respects, there are reasons to believe that – without direct design interventions – they will continue to be affected by inequities evidenced in present-day AI systems (Bommasani et al., 2022a). Many of the access-related risks we foresee mirror those described in the case studies and types of differential access.

    From The Ethics of Advanced AI Assistants (Gabriel2024)

  38. 24.10.01 · Risk Sub-Category

    Access and Opportunity risks

    Entrenchment and exacerbation of existing inequalities

    "The most serious access-related risks posed by advanced AI assistants concern the entrenchment and exacerbation of existing inequalities (World Inequality Database) or the creation of novel, previously unknown, inequities. While advanced AI assistants are novel technology in certain respects, there are reasons to believe that – without direct design interventions – they will continue to be affected by inequities evidenced in present-day AI systems (Bommasani et al., 2022a). Many of the access-related risks we foresee mirror those described in the case studies and types of differential access.

    From The Ethics of Advanced AI Assistants (Gabriel2024)

  39. 24.10.02 · Risk Sub-Category

    Access and Opportunity risks

    Current access risks

    "At the same time, and despite this overall trend, AI systems are also not easily accessible to many communities. Such direct inaccessibility occurs for a variety of reasons, including: purposeful non-release (situation type 1; Wiggers and Stringer, 2023), prohibitive paywalls (situation type 2; Rogers, 2023; Shankland, 2023), hardware and compute requirements or bandwidth (situation types 1 and 2; OpenAI, 2023), or language barriers (e.g. they only function well in English (situation type 2; Snyder, 2023), with more serious errors occurring in other languages (situation type 3; Deck, 2023). S

    From The Ethics of Advanced AI Assistants (Gabriel2024)

  40. 24.10.04 · Risk Sub-Category

    Access and Opportunity risks

    Emergent access risks

    "Emergent access risks are most likely to arise when current and novel capabilities are combined. Emergent risks can be difficult to foresee fully (Ovadya and Whittlestone, 2019; Prunkl et al., 2021) due to the novelty of the technology (see Chapter 1) and the biases of those who engage in product design or foresight processes D’Ignazio and Klein (2020). Indeed, people who occupy relatively advantaged social, educational and economic positions in society are often poorly equipped to foresee and prevent harm because they are disconnected from lived experiences of those who would be affected. Dr

    From The Ethics of Advanced AI Assistants (Gabriel2024)

  41. 33.01.06 · Risk Sub-Category

    Ethical Concerns

    Digital divide

    "The digital divide is often defined as the gap between those who have and do not have access to computers and the Internet (Van Dijk, 2006). As the Internet gradually becomes ubiquitous, a second-level digital divide, which refers to the gap in Internet skills and usage between different groups and cultures, is brought up as a concern (Scheerder et al., 2017). As an emerging technology, generative AI may widen the existing digital divide in society. The “invisible” AI underlying AI-enabled systems has made the interaction between humans and technology more complicated (Carter et al., 2020). F

    From Generative AI and ChatGPT: Applications, Challenges, and AI-Human Collaboration (Nah2023)

  42. 35.05.00 · Risk Category

    Value lock-in

    the most powerful AI systems may be designed by and available to fewer and fewer stakeholders. This may enable, for instance, regimes to enforce narrow values through pervasive surveillance and oppressive censorship

    From X-Risk Analysis for AI Research (Hendrycks2022)

  43. 41.02.02 · Risk Sub-Category

    Political

    Potential exploitation by totalitarian regimes

  44. 49.03.03 · Risk Sub-Category

    Systemic Risks

    Market concentration risks and single points of failure

    "Market power is concentrated among a few companies that are the only ones able to build the leading general- purpose AI models. Widespread adoption of a few general- purpose AI models and systems by critical sectors including finance, cybersecurity, and defence creates systemic risk because any flaws, vulnerabilities, bugs, or inherent biases in the dominant general- purpose AI models and systems could cause simultaneous failures and disruptions on a broad scale across these interdependent sectors."

    From International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI (Bengio2024)

  45. 52.03.00 · Risk Category

    Systemic Risks

    "In addition to risks stemming from the unreliability or misuse of general purpose AI models, further Systemic Risks can originate from the centralisation of general purpose AI development as well as the rapid integration of these models into our lives."

    From Governing General Purpose AI: A Comprehensive Map of Unreliability, Misuse and Systemic Risks (Maham2023 )

  46. 52.03.01 · Risk Sub-Category

    Systemic Risks

    Economic Power Centralisation and Inequality

    "Increasingly advanced general purpose AI models pose the risk of a concentration of economic power and exacerbation of existing inequalities through disparities in effective access to these models. This can materialise on multiple levels, between developers of general purpose AI models and companies building applications on them, between individuals and between countries on a global scale."

    From Governing General Purpose AI: A Comprehensive Map of Unreliability, Misuse and Systemic Risks (Maham2023 )

  47. 53.03.05 · Risk Sub-Category

    Direct catastrophe from AI

    Dystopian trajectory lock-in because of misuse of advanced AI to establish and/or maintain totalitarian regimes;

  48. "Power and inequality: there are a lot of pathways through which AI seems likely to increase power concentration and inequality, though there is little analysis of the potential long- term impacts of these pathways. Nonetheless, AI precipitating more extreme power concentration and inequality than exists today seems a real possibility on current trends."

    From A Survey of the Potential Long-term Impacts of AI: How AI Could Lead to Long-term Changes in Science, Cooperation, Power, Epistemics and Values (Clarke2023)

  49. "The concentration of military, economic, or political power of entities in possession or control of AI or AI-enabled technologies."

    From A Taxonomy of Systemic Risks from General-Purpose AI (Uuk2025)

  50. 61.02.07 · Risk Sub-Category

    Sources of systemic risks from general-purpose AI

    Algorithmic monoculture

    "The dominance of specific AI models could lead to a lack of diversity in approaches, amplifying systemic risks if these models fail."

    From A Taxonomy of Systemic Risks from General-Purpose AI (Uuk2025)

Informational only, not legal advice. Verify every claim against the linked official sources and consult qualified counsel before acting.