MIT AI Risk Repository

Browse AI risks

2,500 risk entries extracted from 74 frameworks, coded by domain, subdomain, causal entity, intent and timing. Filter, then export the current selection with its licence and citation attached.

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2,500 entries · page 35 of 50

  1. 16.06.02.b · Additional evidence

    Risk area 6: Environmental and Socioeconomic harms

    Increasing inequality and negative effects on job quality

  2. 17.01.01.a · Additional evidence

    Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity

    Social stereotypes and unfair discrmination

  3. 17.01.02.a · Additional evidence

    Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity

    Exclusionary norms

  4. 17.01.02.b · Additional evidence

    Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity

    Exclusionary norms

  5. 17.01.02.c · Additional evidence

    Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity

    Exclusionary norms

  6. 17.01.04.a · Additional evidence

    Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity

    Lower performance for some languages and social groups

  7. 17.02.01.a · Additional evidence

    Information Hazards

    Compromising privacy by leaking private infiormation

  8. 17.02.01.b · Additional evidence

    Information Hazards

    Compromising privacy by leaking private infiormation

  9. 17.02.02.a · Additional evidence

    Information Hazards

    Compromising privacy by correctly inferring private information

  10. 17.02.03.a · Additional evidence

    Information Hazards

    Risks from leaking or correctly inferring sensitive information

  11. 17.02.03.b · Additional evidence

    Information Hazards

    Risks from leaking or correctly inferring sensitive information

  12. 17.03.01.a · Additional evidence

    Misinformation Harms

    Disseminating false or misleading information

  13. 17.03.02.a · Additional evidence

    Misinformation Harms

    Causing material harm by disseminating false or poor information

  14. 17.03.02.b · Additional evidence

    Misinformation Harms

    Causing material harm by disseminating false or poor information

  15. 17.04.01.a · Additional evidence

    Malicious Uses

    Making disinformation cheaper and more effective

  16. 17.04.01.b · Additional evidence

    Malicious Uses

    Making disinformation cheaper and more effective

  17. 17.04.01.c · Additional evidence

    Malicious Uses

    Making disinformation cheaper and more effective

  18. 17.04.02.a · Additional evidence

    Malicious Uses

    Facilitating fraud, scames and more targeted manipulation

  19. 17.04.02.b · Additional evidence

    Malicious Uses

    Facilitating fraud, scames and more targeted manipulation

  20. 17.05.02.a · Additional evidence

    Human-Computer Interaction Harms

    Creating avenues for exploiting user trust, nudging or manipulation

  21. 17.05.02.b · Additional evidence

    Human-Computer Interaction Harms

    Creating avenues for exploiting user trust, nudging or manipulation

  22. 17.05.02.c · Additional evidence

    Human-Computer Interaction Harms

    Creating avenues for exploiting user trust, nudging or manipulation

  23. 17.05.03.a · Additional evidence

    Human-Computer Interaction Harms

    Promoting harmful stereotypes by implying gender or ethnic identity

  24. 17.06.01.a · Additional evidence

    Automation, Access and Environmental Harms

    Environmental harms from operation LMs

  25. 17.06.01.b · Additional evidence

    Automation, Access and Environmental Harms

    Environmental harms from operation LMs

  26. 17.06.02.a · Additional evidence

    Automation, Access and Environmental Harms

    Increasing inequality and negative effects on job quality

  27. 17.06.02.b · Additional evidence

    Automation, Access and Environmental Harms

    Increasing inequality and negative effects on job quality

  28. "Fig 3 shows that technological, data, and analytical AI risks are characterised by the loss of control over AI systems, whereby in particular the autonomous decision and its consequences are classified as risk factors since they are not subject to human influence (Boyd & Wilson, 2017; Scherer, 2016; Wirtz et al., 2019). Programming errors in algorithms due to the lack of expert knowledge or to the increasing complexity and black-box character of AI systems may also lead to undesired AI results (Boyd & Wilson, 2017; Danaher et al., 2017). In addition, a lack of data, poor data quality, and bia

    From Governance of artificial intelligence: A risk and guideline-based integrative framework (Wirtz2022)

  29. 20.01.01.a · Additional evidence

    AI Law and Regulation

    Governance of autonomous intelligence systems

  30. 20.03.02 · Risk Sub-Category

    AI Society

    Social acceptance and trust in AI

    "Social acceptance and trust in AI is highly interconnected with the other challenges mentioned. Acceptance and trust result from the extent to which an individual’s subjective expectation corresponds to the real effect of AI on the individual’s life. In the case of transparent and explainable AI, acceptance may be high but if an individual encounters harmful AI behavior like discrimination, acceptance for AI will eventually decline (COMEST, 2017).

    From The Dark Sides of Artificial Intelligence: An Integrated AI Governance Framework for Public Administration (Wirtz2020)

  31. 21.01.00 · Risk Category

    Data-level risk

  32. 21.01.02.a · Additional evidence

    Data-level risk

    Dataset shift

  33. 21.01.02.b · Additional evidence

    Data-level risk

    Dataset shift

  34. 21.01.02.c · Additional evidence

    Data-level risk

    Dataset shift

  35. 21.01.04.a · Additional evidence

    Adversarial attack

  36. 21.02.00 · Risk Category

    Model-level risk

  37. 21.02.01.b · Additional evidence

    Model-level risk

    Model misspecification

  38. 21.02.01.c · Additional evidence

    Model-level risk

    Model misspecification

  39. 21.02.01.d · Additional evidence

    Model-level risk

    Model misspecification

  40. 22.01.01.a · Additional evidence

    Malicious Use (Intentional)

    Bioterrorism

    From An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks (Hendrycks2023)

  41. 22.01.01.b · Additional evidence

    Malicious Use (Intentional)

    Bioterrorism

    From An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks (Hendrycks2023)

  42. 22.01.01.c · Additional evidence

    Malicious Use (Intentional)

    Bioterrorism

    From An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks (Hendrycks2023)

  43. 22.01.01.d · Additional evidence

    Malicious Use (Intentional)

    Bioterrorism

    From An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks (Hendrycks2023)

  44. 22.01.02.a · Additional evidence

    Malicious Use (Intentional)

    Unleashing AI Agents

    From An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks (Hendrycks2023)

  45. 22.01.03.a · Additional evidence

    Malicious Use (Intentional)

    Persuasive AIs

    From An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks (Hendrycks2023)

  46. 22.01.03.b · Additional evidence

    Malicious Use (Intentional)

    Persuasive AIs

    From An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks (Hendrycks2023)

  47. 22.01.04.a · Additional evidence

    Malicious Use (Intentional)

    Concentration of Power

    From An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks (Hendrycks2023)

  48. 22.01.04.b · Additional evidence

    Malicious Use (Intentional)

    Concentration of Power

    From An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks (Hendrycks2023)

  49. 22.01.04.c · Additional evidence

    Malicious Use (Intentional)

    Concentration of Power

    From An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks (Hendrycks2023)

  50. 22.02.01.a · Additional evidence

    AI Race (Environmental/Structural)

    Military AI Arms Race

    From An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks (Hendrycks2023)

Informational only, not legal advice. Verify every claim against the linked official sources and consult qualified counsel before acting.