Artificial Intelligence Policy Tracker

MIT AI Risk Repository

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3 risk entries extracted from 74 frameworks, coded by domain, subdomain, causal entity, intent and timing. Filter, then export the current selection with its licence and citation attached.

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3 entries

  1. 73.03.01 · Risk Sub-Category

    Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs

    Misinformation and Manipulation

    "Recent studies have demonstrated that LLMs can be exploited to craft deceptive narratives with levels of persuasiveness similar to human-generated content (Pan et al., 2023b; Spitale et al., 2023), to fabri- cate fake news (Zellers et al., 2019; Zhou et al., 2023f), and to devise automated influence operations aimed at manipulating the perspectives of targeted audiences (Goldstein et al., 2023). LLMs have also been found to be used in malicious social botnets (Yang and Menczer, 2023), powering automated accounts used to disseminate coordinated messages. More broadly, the use of LLMs for the d

    From Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models (Anwar2024)

  2. "LLMs may exacerbate cybersecurity risks in various ways (Newman, 2024). Firstly, LLMs may significantly amplify the effectiveness of deceptive operations aimed at tricking people into disclosing sensitive information or granting adversary access to critical resources. For example, LLMs might prove highly effective at crafting personalized phishing emails or messages at scale that may be harder for an average user to recognize as phishing attempts (Karanjai, 2022; Hazell, 2023). In addition to being directly harmful to the targeted individual, such ‘social engineering’ attacks are often the ba

    From Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models (Anwar2024)

  3. 73.03.06 · Risk Sub-Category

    Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs

    Domain-Specific Misuses

    "Improvements in LLMs may exert greater pressure to apply LLMs to various domains, such as health and education (Eloundou et al., 2023). Crude efforts to use LLMs in such domains, however, may incur harm and should be discouraged strongly. In particular, it is important to guard against different ways in which LLMs may be misused within any domain. One famous episode of misuse within the health sector is a mental health non-profit experimenting LLM-based therapy on its users without their informed consent (Xiang, 2023a). Within the education sector, LLMs may be misused in various ways that mig

    From Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models (Anwar2024)

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Frequently asked questions

Where do these risk entries come from?

The MIT AI Risk Repository, which extracts risks from dozens of published frameworks, taxonomies and papers and codes each one by domain and subdomain, and by a causal taxonomy of entity, intent and timing. This is a browseable copy, attributed and openly licensed, not original research.

What do entity, intent and timing mean?

They are the causal coding. Entity is whether a human or the AI system is the cause; intent is whether the harm was intentional or not; timing is whether it arises before or after deployment. Together they let you separate misuse from malfunction.

Can I export the results?

Yes, any filtered set exports as CSV or JSON, and every export carries the upstream source, licence and citation with it, because attribution is a condition of the licence rather than a courtesy.

What is the MIT AI Risk Repository?

A living database of AI risks extracted from published frameworks, taxonomies and papers, classified by a causal taxonomy of entity, intent and timing and by a domain taxonomy of seven domains and 24 subdomains. It is published by the MIT AI Risk Initiative under CC BY 4.0.