Practical requirements extracted from policy instruments, with the source article, the actors they bind, evidence examples and original framework mappings. Legal requirements are marked; everything else is voluntary guidance.
An automated employment decision tool may not be used to screen candidates or employees for hiring or promotion in New York City unless it has been the subject of a bias audit by an independent auditor within the year before use. The audit calculates selection rates and impact ratios by sex, race/ethnicity and their intersections, and scoring-rate comparisons for tools that score rather than select, using the employer's historical data or, where insufficient, test data as the DCWP rules allow.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 5 Jul 2023
Legal requirementAI literacy and training·European Union
Providers and deployers must take measures to ensure, to their best extent, a sufficient level of AI literacy among their staff and other persons dealing with the operation and use of AI systems on their behalf, taking into account technical knowledge, experience, training, the context of use and the persons affected.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Feb 2025
Legal requirementConformity assessment and registration·European Union
EU AI Act · Articles 43, 47, 48 and 49; Annex VIII
Before placing a high-risk system on the market, providers must complete the applicable conformity assessment (internal control or notified-body assessment depending on the system), draw up an EU declaration of conformity, affix the CE marking, and register the system in the EU database. Deployers that are public authorities must also register their use of Annex III systems.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
Legal requirementData governance and quality·European Union
To the extent a deployer controls the data fed into a high-risk AI system, it must make sure that input data is relevant to, and sufficiently representative for, the system's intended purpose. The duty sits with the deployer even though the provider designed the system, because the deployer chooses what the system is run on.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
Legal requirementGovernance and accountability·European Union
A distributor, importer, deployer or other third party is treated as the provider of a high-risk AI system, with all Article 16 duties, if it puts its own name or trademark on a system already on the market, makes a substantial modification to a high-risk system that stays high-risk, or changes the intended purpose of a system so that it becomes high-risk. The original provider then ceases to be provider for that system but must cooperate and supply the information and access needed for the new provider to comply.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
Legal requirementGovernance and accountability·European Union
A deployer using a high-risk post-remote biometric identification system in a criminal investigation must request authorisation from a judicial or independent administrative authority in advance or within 48 hours, unless the use is only the initial identification of a potential suspect on objective and verifiable facts. Use is limited to a targeted search; if authorisation is refused, use stops and the data is deleted. No adverse legal decision may rest solely on the output, each use is documented, and the deployer reports annually to the market surveillance and data protection authorities.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
Legal requirementGovernance and accountability·South Korea
Operators of high-impact AI must prepare and implement a plan to protect users, and must prepare and keep documents describing the measures they take to secure the AI's safety and reliability, so that they can be shown to the Ministry of Science and ICT on request. Further items may be added by Presidential Decree, and the ministry may publish guidelines on how to meet these duties.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 22 Jan 2026
Legal requirementGovernance and accountability·European Union
Deployers of high-risk AI must take technical and organisational measures to use systems according to the instructions, assign human oversight, ensure input data is relevant where they control it, monitor operation, inform the provider and authorities of risks or serious incidents, keep logs, inform workers' representatives before deploying at the workplace, inform affected natural persons where decisions are made about them, and cooperate with authorities.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
ICO AI guidance · UK GDPR Article 22 as amended by the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025
Individuals have rights in relation to solely automated decisions that produce legal or similarly significant effects, including being told about the decision, obtaining human intervention, and contesting it. The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 amended these rules; the reviewer must confirm the current wording.
Source-linked (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
The advance notice to candidates and employees must allow them to request an alternative selection process or a reasonable accommodation. The DCWP rules make clear that the law itself does not require the employer to provide an alternative process, but the request route must exist and accommodation requests remain governed by disability and human-rights law. Instructions for making the request must be included in the notice.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 5 Jul 2023
EU AI Act · Article 14; Article 26(2) for deployers
High-risk systems must be designed with human-machine interface tools so natural persons can effectively oversee them, understand capacities and limitations, avoid automation bias, interpret output, decide not to use the system, and intervene or stop it. Deployers must assign oversight to people with the necessary competence, training and authority. For certain remote biometric identification systems, action requires verification by at least two competent persons.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
A consumer who receives an adverse consequential decision may obtain meaningful review by a person with the authority and information to change the outcome. Scope and timing follow the enrolled bill.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 1 Jan 2027
Operators of high-impact AI must ensure that the AI is subject to human management and supervision, so that people remain able to monitor its operation and intervene in or override its outputs where those outputs may affect life, physical safety or fundamental rights.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 22 Jan 2026
UAE PDPL · Article on data-subject rights relating to automated processing (reviewer to cite article number)
Data subjects may object to decisions based solely on automated processing, including profiling, that produce legal or similarly serious effects, subject to exceptions such as contractual necessity or consent.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
ICO AI guidance · UK GDPR Article 35; ICO guidance, accountability and governance section
Where AI processing of personal data is likely to result in a high risk to individuals, UK GDPR requires a DPIA before processing begins. The ICO treats most AI involving profiling, large-scale processing or novel technology as meeting this threshold.
Source-linked (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
Before deploying most Annex III high-risk systems, deployers that are bodies governed by public law or private entities providing public services, and deployers using systems for creditworthiness assessment or life and health insurance pricing, must assess the impact on fundamental rights: the processes, period and frequency of use, categories of affected persons, specific risks of harm, human-oversight measures and mitigation, and notify the market-surveillance authority of the results.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
UAE PDPL · Article on data protection impact assessment (reviewer to cite article number)
Before processing that uses modern technologies and is likely to pose a high risk to privacy, controllers must assess the impact on personal data protection, covering the processing, its purposes, risks and safeguards.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
Deployers must complete an impact assessment before deployment, annually, and within 90 days of any intentional and substantial modification, covering purpose, risks of algorithmic discrimination and mitigation, data categories, performance metrics, transparency measures and post-deployment monitoring, and retain assessments for at least three years.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
Entities notified as Significant Data Fiduciaries, based on factors such as volume and sensitivity of data and risk to individuals, must appoint a Data Protection Officer based in India, an independent data auditor, and periodically undertake data protection impact assessments and audits.
Source-linked (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
If a deployer discovers that a high-risk AI system it uses has caused algorithmic discrimination, it must send a notice to the Colorado Attorney General within 90 days of the discovery, in the form the Attorney General prescribes, without unreasonable delay.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
Legal requirementIncident reporting and handling·India
India DPDP Act · Section 8(5) and 8(6); DPDP Rules on breach intimation
Data Fiduciaries must protect personal data with reasonable security safeguards and, on a personal data breach, inform the Data Protection Board and each affected individual in the form and manner prescribed by the Rules.
Source-linked (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
Legal requirementIncident reporting and handling·European Union
Providers of high-risk AI systems must report serious incidents to the market-surveillance authority of the Member State where the incident occurred, immediately after establishing a causal link (or reasonable likelihood) and no later than 15 days after becoming aware, with shorter limits for the most serious cases such as widespread infringements or death. Deployers must inform the provider and authorities when they identify a serious incident.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
Deployers must monitor a high-risk AI system's operation against the provider's instructions and feed observations to the provider under Article 72. If they have reason to think the system as used may present a risk to health, safety or fundamental rights, they must inform the provider or distributor and the market surveillance authority without undue delay and suspend use. On a serious incident, they must immediately inform the provider, then the importer or distributor and the authorities. Financial institutions meet this through their internal governance rules.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
Legal requirementPrivacy and personal-data protection·Nepal
Nepal Privacy Act 2075 · Chapter on collection and protection of personal information (reviewer to cite sections)
Personal information may be collected only by authorised persons for a lawful purpose with the individual's consent, and must not be used or disclosed for other purposes without consent, subject to statutory exceptions. AI systems trained on or processing personal data of people in Nepal must respect these limits.
Pending review (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)
Legal requirementPrivacy and personal-data protection·European Union
Where a deployer of a high-risk AI system is required to carry out a data protection impact assessment under Article 35 of the GDPR or Article 27 of the Law Enforcement Directive, it must draw on the information the provider supplied under Article 13, such as the intended purpose, performance, limitations and human-oversight measures, when producing that assessment.
Verified (a factual check against the official source, not a legal review)Applies from 2 Dec 2027
A single practical requirement pulled out of an instrument and stated on its own: keep a risk management system, log incidents, document training data, provide human oversight, and so on. Each one cites the article or section it comes from so you can check it against the source.
Does a voluntary obligation have legal force?
No, and every obligation is labelled either a legal requirement or voluntary guidance. Voluntary items still matter in practice, because procurement questionnaires and auditors ask about them, but only the binding ones carry legal consequence.
How do I find the obligations that apply to my organisation?
Filter by jurisdiction, category, actor, sector or use case. The applicability check asks a short set of questions and returns the duties that may reach you. It is an educational screen, not a legal determination, and it says so.
Why do some instruments have no obligations listed?
Because nobody has broken them out yet. Most instruments are recorded at summary level first; obligations are added jurisdiction by jurisdiction. The coverage and open-gaps pages publish exactly what is missing rather than hiding it.