AI risk
AI attacks and incidents: the record in charts
What has gone wrong with AI, who caused it, whether it was meant, and how that compares with the risks that frameworks describe. Every figure is a count of records in the AI Incident Database or the MIT AI Risk Repository. "Attack" here means an incident coded as deliberate. This page has no list of records: those are on the pages it links to.
Incidents coded "Intentional" in the MIT causal taxonomy: the outcome was the expected result of someone, or something, pursuing a goal.
In brief
735 of the 1,496 classified incidents in the AI Incident Database (49%) are coded as deliberate: the outcome was the expected result of pursuing a goal. 239 are dated in the 12 months to February 2026, up 12% on the 214 of the 12 months before. 128 newer incidents are recorded but not yet classified, so comparisons stop at February 2026.
- Incidents in view
- 735
- 49% of the 1,496 classified
- 12 months to February 2026
- 239
- +12% on the 12 months before (214)
- Carried out by a person
- 63%
- 37% attributed to an AI system
- Not yet classified
- 128
- incidents dated after February 2026
1. Rising: up 12% in the 12 months to February 2026
239 incidents coded as deliberate are dated in the 12 months to February 2026, against 214 in the 12 months before. The comparison stops at February 2026 on purpose: 128 newer incidents are on record without a classification, and counting those months would show a fall that is only a backlog.
- Deliberate misuse
- All recorded incidents
- Classification incomplete
| Month | Deliberate misuse | All recorded incidents | Classification |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023-10 | 13 | 18 | complete |
| 2023-11 | 4 | 10 | complete |
| 2023-12 | 13 | 22 | complete |
| 2024-01 | 10 | 17 | complete |
| 2024-02 | 16 | 27 | complete |
| 2024-03 | 17 | 20 | complete |
| 2024-04 | 17 | 36 | complete |
| 2024-05 | 12 | 25 | complete |
| 2024-06 | 11 | 26 | complete |
| 2024-07 | 13 | 25 | complete |
| 2024-08 | 15 | 24 | complete |
| 2024-09 | 22 | 28 | complete |
| 2024-10 | 22 | 34 | complete |
| 2024-11 | 12 | 18 | complete |
| 2024-12 | 18 | 26 | complete |
| 2025-01 | 22 | 32 | complete |
| 2025-02 | 33 | 47 | complete |
| 2025-03 | 30 | 44 | complete |
| 2025-04 | 27 | 47 | complete |
| 2025-05 | 22 | 34 | complete |
| 2025-06 | 28 | 44 | complete |
| 2025-07 | 19 | 39 | complete |
| 2025-08 | 16 | 35 | complete |
| 2025-09 | 10 | 17 | complete |
| 2025-10 | 21 | 41 | complete |
| 2025-11 | 14 | 28 | complete |
| 2025-12 | 23 | 44 | complete |
| 2026-01 | 18 | 38 | complete |
| 2026-02 | 11 | 30 | complete |
| 2026-03 | 11 | 27 | incomplete |
| 2026-04 | 8 | 25 | incomplete |
| 2026-05 | 6 | 35 | incomplete |
| 2026-06 | 0 | 23 | incomplete |
| 2026-07 | 0 | 33 | incomplete |
| 2026-08 | 0 | 13 | incomplete |
| 2026-09 | 0 | 15 | incomplete |
2. Who was responsible, was it meant, and what kind of harm
The widest path is a person acting with deliberate effect: 463 of the 735 classified incidents in view (63%). Follow a colour from left to right to see where deliberate and accidental incidents end up.
- Deliberate (coded Intentional)
| From | To | Incidents |
|---|---|---|
| AI | Deliberate | 271 |
| Human | Deliberate | 463 |
| Other | Deliberate | 1 |
| Deliberate | Malicious actors | 538 |
| Deliberate | Misinformation | 56 |
| Deliberate | Human-Computer Interaction | 9 |
| Deliberate | Discrimination & Toxicity | 44 |
| Deliberate | Privacy & Security | 53 |
| Deliberate | Socioeconomic & Environmental | 17 |
| Deliberate | AI system safety, failures, & limitations | 18 |
3. Where incidents concentrate, year by year
The eight kinds of incident with the most records in view. A darker cell is a larger count. The last column is a part year, and its newest incidents are not classified yet.
| Subdomain \ Year | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.3 Fraud, scams, and targeted manipulation | 3 | 7 | 4 | 12 | 42 | 100 | 183 | 37 |
| 4.1 Disinformation, surveillance, and influence at scale | 2 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 21 | 49 | 37 | 8 |
| 3.1 False or misleading information | — | — | 1 | — | 12 | 14 | 23 | 3 |
| 2.1 Compromise of privacy by obtaining, leaking or correctly inferring sensitive information | 4 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 1 |
| 1.1 Unfair discrimination and misrepresentation | 2 | 4 | 1 | 3 | — | 1 | — | — |
| 1.2 Exposure to toxic content | — | 1 | — | 2 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 1 |
| 7.3 Lack of capability or robustness | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | — |
| 4.2 Cyberattacks, weapon development or use, and mass harm | — | 1 | — | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | — |
4. What is described against what is recorded
The MIT AI Risk Repository codes 537 risk entries from 74 frameworks to the same subdomains as the incidents in view. Where the two shares differ, either the frameworks are ahead of the record or the record is ahead of the frameworks. Across 23 subdomains the two rankings agree weakly (Spearman's rank correlation 0.20).
- 1 Discrimination & Toxicity
- 2 Privacy & Security
- 3 Misinformation
- 4 Malicious actors
- 5 Human-Computer Interaction
- 6 Socioeconomic & Environmental
- 7 AI system safety, failures, & limitations
- Bubble size: incidents recorded. Dashed line: equal shares. Square-root scale. Unlabelled bubbles are named when pointed at.
| Subdomain | Share of incidents (%) | Incidents | Share of risk entries (%) | Risk entries |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.3 Fraud, scams, and targeted manipulation | 53.8 | 395 | 11.7 | 63 |
| 4.1 Disinformation, surveillance, and influence at scale | 18.1 | 133 | 13.6 | 73 |
| 3.1 False or misleading information | 7.4 | 54 | 0.9 | 5 |
| 2.1 Compromise of privacy by obtaining, leaking or correctly inferring sensitive information | 6.1 | 45 | 1.9 | 10 |
| 1.1 Unfair discrimination and misrepresentation | 3 | 22 | 0.4 | 2 |
| 1.2 Exposure to toxic content | 2.5 | 18 | 1.3 | 7 |
| 7.3 Lack of capability or robustness | 2 | 15 | 1.1 | 6 |
| 4.2 Cyberattacks, weapon development or use, and mass harm | 1.2 | 9 | 12.7 | 68 |
| 2.2 AI system security vulnerabilities and attacks | 1.1 | 8 | 15.5 | 83 |
| 5.1 Overreliance and unsafe use | 1 | 7 | 1.3 | 7 |
| 6.1 Power centralization and unfair distribution of benefits | 0.7 | 5 | 3.4 | 18 |
| 6.2 Increased inequality and decline in employment quality | 0.7 | 5 | 3.5 | 19 |
| 1.3 Unequal performance across groups | 0.5 | 4 | 0.2 | 1 |
| 6.3 Economic and cultural devaluation of human effort | 0.4 | 3 | 2 | 11 |
| 3.2 Pollution of information ecosystem and loss of consensus reality | 0.3 | 2 | 0.2 | 1 |
| 5.2 Loss of human agency and autonomy | 0.3 | 2 | 1.1 | 6 |
| 6.4 Competitive dynamics | 0.3 | 2 | 1.7 | 9 |
| 7.4 Lack of transparency or interpretability | 0.3 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 6.5 Governance failure | 0.1 | 1 | 0.4 | 2 |
| 6.6 Environmental harm | 0.1 | 1 | 0.9 | 5 |
| 7.1 AI pursuing its own goals in conflict with human goals or values | 0.1 | 1 | 9.5 | 51 |
| 7.2 AI possessing dangerous capabilities | 0 | 0 | 9.7 | 52 |
| 7.6 Multi-agent risks | 0 | 0 | 2.8 | 15 |
- Incidents recorded
- Risk entries described
Responsible
- A person
- 63%Incidents recorded
- 66%Risk entries described
- An AI system
- 37%Incidents recorded
- 27%Risk entries described
- Other or unclear
- 0%Incidents recorded
- 7%Risk entries described
Timing
- After release
- 98%Incidents recorded
- 73%Risk entries described
- Before release
- 2%Incidents recorded
- 8%Risk entries described
- Other or unclear
- 0%Incidents recorded
- 19%Risk entries described
5. Who is harmed, and by what
The parties named most often as harmed, or nearly harmed, in the classified incidents in view, and the kind of risk behind each. Read a row as that party's risk profile and a column as the parties one kind of risk reaches. The record names values (epistemic integrity, privacy) as well as people, and a name is an allegation in a report, not a finding.
| Harmed party | 1Discrimination & Toxicity | 2Privacy & Security | 3Misinformation | 4Malicious actors | 5Human-Computer Interaction | 6Socioeconomic & Environmental | 7AI system safety, failures, & limitations | Incidents |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Epistemic Integrity | 3 | 2 | 22 | 174 | · | 1 | · | 202 |
| General Public | 6 | 6 | 25 | 144 | · | · | · | 181 |
| Privacy | 6 | 32 | · | 34 | 1 | · | · | 73 |
| Democratic Integrity | 1 | · | 6 | 62 | · | · | · | 69 |
| National Security And Intelligence Stakeholders | · | 1 | 5 | 43 | · | · | · | 49 |
| Students | 4 | 1 | 1 | 38 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 49 |
| Women and girls | 3 | · | · | 35 | · | · | · | 38 |
| Minors | 2 | 4 | · | 29 | · | · | · | 35 |
- 1 Discrimination & Toxicity
- 2 Privacy & Security
- 3 Misinformation
- 4 Malicious actors
- 5 Human-Computer Interaction
- 6 Socioeconomic & Environmental
- 7 AI system safety, failures, & limitations
- Information and communication
- 13
- Arts
- 7
- Entertainment and recreation
- 7
- Professional
- 4
- Scientific and technical activities
- 4
- Education
- 4
- Financial and insurance activities
- 3
- Administrative and support service activities
- 3
6. Where to look first
The questions a risk owner brings to this record, answered from the counts above. Each answer describes the record, not your exposure: use it to choose which subdomain to open.
Which kind of incident is recorded most?
4.3 Fraud, scams, and targeted manipulation: 155 of the 239 incidents coded as deliberate dated in the 12 months to February 2026 (65%).
Which is growing fastest?
3.1 False or misleading information: 20 incidents in the 12 months to February 2026, against 15 in the 12 months before.
What is recorded more often than the frameworks describe?
4.3 Fraud, scams, and targeted manipulation is 54% of the classified incidents here and 12% of the 537 matching risk entries in the MIT AI Risk Repository.
What is described far more than it is recorded?
2.2 AI system security vulnerabilities and attacks: 16% of the risk entries and 1.1% of the incidents (8). A low count is not a low risk: a harm that has not happened yet, or is not reported, leaves no record.
The board: one card for each kind of incident
Every kind with at least 10 records in view, busiest first. The label on each card is worked out from two counts, by the rules under the cards.
4.3 · Malicious actors
SteadyFraud, scams, and targeted manipulation
- Year to Feb 2026
- 155
- +16% (from 134)
- All years
- 395
- 54% of view
- Deliberate
- 100%
- 12% of risk entries
52 instruments on record for this risk domain
4.1 · Malicious actors
SteadyDisinformation, surveillance, and influence at scale
- Year to Feb 2026
- 41
- -5% (from 43)
- All years
- 133
- 18% of view
- Deliberate
- 100%
- 14% of risk entries
52 instruments on record for this risk domain
3.1 · Misinformation
RisingFalse or misleading information
- Year to Feb 2026
- 20
- +33% (from 15)
- All years
- 54
- 7.4% of view
- Deliberate
- 100%
- 0.9% of risk entries
50 instruments on record for this risk domain
2.1 · Privacy & Security
SparseCompromise of privacy by obtaining, leaking or correctly inferring sensitive information
- Year to Feb 2026
- 4
- -50% (from 8)
- All years
- 45
- 6.1% of view
- Deliberate
- 100%
- 1.9% of risk entries
16 instruments on record for this risk domain
1.2 · Discrimination & Toxicity
SparseExposure to toxic content
- Year to Feb 2026
- 4
- -20% (from 5)
- All years
- 18
- 2.5% of view
- Deliberate
- 100%
- 1.3% of risk entries
25 instruments on record for this risk domain
7.3 · AI system safety, failures, & limitations
SparseLack of capability or robustness
- Year to Feb 2026
- 1
- -50% (from 2)
- All years
- 15
- 2% of view
- Deliberate
- 100%
- 1.1% of risk entries
52 instruments on record for this risk domain
1.1 · Discrimination & Toxicity
SparseUnfair discrimination and misrepresentation
- Year to Feb 2026
- 0
- -100% (from 1)
- All years
- 22
- 3% of view
- Deliberate
- 100%
- 0.4% of risk entries
25 instruments on record for this risk domain
- Rising
- at least 10 incidents in the last 12 months and up 25% or more on the 12 before.
- Steady
- at least 10 incidents in the last 12 months and within 25% of the 12 before.
- Easing
- at least 10 incidents in the 12 months before and down 25% or more since.
- Emerging
- fewer than 10 incidents in the last 12 months, at least three, and more than in the 12 before.
- Sparse
- too few recent incidents to state a direction.
7. What the rules on record cover
The same seven risk domains twice: the incidents in view, and the policy instruments in this tracker whose recorded use cases fall in that domain. An instrument can count under more than one domain. A long bar on the left beside a short one on the right is a question to ask, not a finding that the rules are missing.
- 1 Discrimination & Toxicity
- 44
- 2 Privacy & Security
- 53
- 3 Misinformation
- 56
- 4 Malicious actors
- 538
- 5 Human-Computer Interaction
- 9
- 6 Socioeconomic & Environmental
- 17
- 7 AI system safety, failures, & limitations
- 18
- 1 Discrimination & Toxicity
- 25
- 2 Privacy & Security
- 16
- 3 Misinformation
- 50
- 4 Malicious actors
- 52
- 5 Human-Computer Interaction
- 56
- 6 Socioeconomic & Environmental
- 142
- 7 AI system safety, failures, & limitations
- 52
How to read this page
- These are reports, not a census. An incident is on record because someone wrote about it and an editor added it. Coverage leans toward English-language media, and a count is not a rate.
- Classification trails the record. The codes for intent, entity and risk domain are added after an incident is recorded. A month is compared only when 75% of its incidents carry a code, which is why the year-on-year figures here end before the newest incident and differ from the calendar figure on AI risk.
- "Deliberate" is a code, not a verdict. It is the MIT causal taxonomy's "Intentional": the outcome was the expected result of pursuing a goal. It covers fraud and impersonation as well as attacks on AI systems themselves.
- Risk entries are counted the same way as the incidents in view. For "Deliberate misuse" only entries coded Intentional are counted; for "Security and malicious use" only entries in domains 2 and 4.
- Updates. Incidents are synced from the AI Incident Database once a day and from its weekly export. Nothing on this page is fetched from the source while you read it.
Disclaimer: informational only, not legal advice. Verify every claim against the linked official sources and consult a qualified lawyer before acting.